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Abstract:
This thesis examines the relationship between IT investments and the transformation of business practices
and organizational structure. In particular, I consider the impact of IT on the location of work and on the
allocation of decision rights. I first study how a firm's IT intensity can affect its ability to exploit regional
cost differentials and locate in lower-cost areas. I develop a framework to analyze the effects of IT on the
regional distribution of work for a homogenous set of Fortune 1000 manufacturing firms. I estimate the
regional demand for customer-service representatives by firms using firm-level data. The framework is a
discrete choice model in which regions play the role of differentiated products. I allow for flexible
substitution patterns between regions by using random coefficients. The latent variable of the model, the
firm's profits from customer care, is derived from the premises of a queueing (stochastic) process. The
estimated demand structure is used to assess the effects of information technology on customer volume,
location choices and cost savings. The results confirm the higher cost sensitivity of IT-intensive firms, but
also suggest that the ability to exploit cost differentials is highly firm-specific and that the importance of
geographically-localized externalities does not vanish. I then develop and test a model to analyze how the
allocation of purchasing decision rights across geographically-dispersed business units influences their IT
investment choices. Since the productivity of many information technologies (in particular communication
technologies) relies on network effects in which the marginal productivity of the adoption of a technology
by a site is higher if the rest of the firm adopts this technology as well, firms have an incentive to require
coordinated investments in technology across the enterprise. Still, research in IS has also highlighted the
fact that the productivity of computer investments is highly dependent on co-investment in complementary
assets (for instance, tacit knowledge and specialized work processes). Many of these additional
investments are intangible and highly dependent on the local expertise and the knowledge of the branch or
division. When local knowledge is important, the uninformed headquarters have an incentive to delegate
decision rights to the local branch. I develop a mathematical model to analyze this tradeoff and derive
testable hypotheses that relate IT investment diversity and the allocation of decision rights.
Decentralization leads to less uniform IT investments and is more likely the less vertically integrated the
firm is. I also provide some empirical support for these hypotheses using a large dataset of firms' IT
investments and allocation of purchasing decision rights.
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1 Introduction
Advances in information technology in the past twenty years, and in particular the
widespread deployment and implementation of enterprise software together with the wide
dissemination of networking technologies (the Internet) in the mid-nineties have enabled
firms to leverage competitive assets across traditional boundaries, including geographical
boundaries. While manufacturing has long been globalizing, information technologies
and in particular communication technologies allow a new wave of globalization, in
services this time. Many large IT firms for example - Microsoft, HP, IBM, EDS, CSC,
Accenture, Cisco - have now moved part of their software development efforts offshore
to Bangalore, India. The phenomenon is highly advertised, and hyped, to the point where
some claim that any organization that does not outsource will lose its competitiveness
(reminiscent of the predictions regarding e-business in the late 90's). Still, others
emphasize the difficulties arising from cultural differences, time differences, language,
reliability, and accountability, issues that are harder to address for services, especially the
kinds that require customer interaction and personalization (Macke, 2003). In fact,
during previous go-global drives, some companies ended up repatriating manufacturing
and design work because they felt they were losing control of core businesses or found
them too hard to coordinate (Engardio, Bernstein and Kripalani, 2003). For instance,
Allegheny Energy Supply, a utility engaged in the supply of electricity and energy-
related commodities, has recently moved its trading operations (a priori, a location-free
activity) back to Pennsylvania in order to be closer to its physical generating plants in the
Midwest and Mid-Atlantic markets.
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The implications of dramatic reorganization of work are far-reaching and affect firms,
workers and ultimately government policies. In fact, the backlash that outsourcing
practices have generated in political spheres is testimony to how important the issue has
become both to firms and the economy as a whole. But there is little systematic analysis
of how much more flexible organizations have become in locating work as a result of
their IT investments, and whether the simple (and perhaps simplistic) model in which the
notion of the firm as an integrated whole will give way to a network of loosely coupled,
footloose entities is an accurate reflection of the reality.
This thesis endeavors to analyze the effects of information technologies (if any) on the
ability of firms to locate their activities efficiently. Efficiency refers to the hiring of
workers with equal skills and capabilities in the most cost-effective regions. A rational
firm should choose the lowest-cost region for each of its activities but may be limited in
its ability to do so by its dependency on local benefits, such as proximity to customers
and other markets. However information technologies may enable firms to overcome
locational dependencies by providing ways to coordinate activities at a distance, globally
exchanging information electronically in seconds through far-reaching large-bandwidth
communication networks and allowing for communication among users across
heterogeneous systems without information degradation.
There exists substantial anecdotal evidence of companies that are using a global
workforce in their daily operations. Companies as varied as GE, Oracle and American
Express employ workers worldwide in order to draw on a larger pool of talent. General
Electric for example, employs almost 6,000 scientists and engineers in 10 foreign
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countries so that it can tap the world's best talent. Oracle and IBM have outsourced
many of their development efforts to countries like Ireland and India. Many consulting
firms have shifted some of the more routine and low-margin work to their international
offices. In recent years, large securities firms have relocated many service operations in
various regions of the United States: American Express placed major traveler's check
and credit card processing facilities in Salt Lake City, Phoenix and Tampa. Charles
Schwab located its major data center in Phoenix, while Merrill Lynch has consolidated
processing operations to 3 major sites in Denver, Jacksonville, FL, and New York City.
Intuitively, technology reduces the need for back-office operations to be close to the
customer or corporate headquarters, prompting firms to relocate some of their activities
to lower-cost regions.
However, cost is not the only factor that firms take into consideration when deciding
where to locate. There are advantages to locating in specific cities where operational
costs are not the lowest, advantages that derive from the proximity to large customer
markets, competitors, suppliers, and to other firms providing complementary services
(such as law firms, for example). It may also be harder for a firm to provide high-quality
service operations when these operations are disembodied from the rest of the firm's
activities. Recently, Dell Computer, a company whose business model is based on cost-
savings decided to move back some of their customer service operations to Austin, TX
from India following complaints from customers about the quality of service that they
were receiving from the call agents in India.
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The main question that this research addresses is estimating the extent to which
information technologies change the relative importance of localized benefits versus unit
costs in firms' location and hiring decisions. In other words, does information
technology, and in particular communication-based technologies substitute for location-
bound non-pecuniary regional advantages and to what extent? If IT substitutes for
geographically localized information and production networks, firms that are more IT-
intensive should be more flexible in the location of their activities as they take advantage
of the lower cost locations. In addition, additional changes in the organizational structure
of the firm may be necessary in order to coordinate geographically-distant business units.
I present and test a model that provides insights into the tradeoffs that managers face
when deciding whether to delegate decision rights to the local branches or centralize
them at the headquarters.
In order to estimate the degree of substitution between technology and local benefits, I
consider a well-defined narrow process, namely customer service. Drawing on a set of
104 Fortune 1000 firms in manufacturing, I developed a framework that allows me to
analyze firms' location and hiring decisions of customer service representatives as the
outcome of the optimization of a discrete choice problem. The location choices depend
on the relative importance of regional benefits versus cost, and how much more a firm is
ready to pay to benefit for these geographically-localized benefits. By incorporating
variables that describe firms' characteristics, in particular their degree of investment in
IT, this research provides quantitative estimates of the impact of IT investments on
various organizational choices (and location choices, in particular) by firms.
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The first chapters of this thesis are devoted to the question of how IT impacts location
decisions, while the last chapter considers the potential impact of IT-driven de-
localization on the organizational structure of the firm (the allocation of decision rights).
The research is structured as follows: the first chapter describes the relevant literature and
theoretical framework from which this research draws. I then review the literature on
discrete choice models and describe the shortcomings of traditional discrete choice
models. Avoiding the limitations of the traditional choice models is one of the main
motivations for the framework used in this research (the use of random coefficients).
Chapter 4 presents the data and develops the basic model. In Chapter 5, I explain the
estimation method. As the model is highly non-linear, I resort to simulation techniques
for the estimation as described in Pakes and Pollard (1989). Chapter 6 presents and
discusses the results. The final chapter, Chapter 7, is concerned with the tradeoffs that
arise in delegating decision rights inside firms when geographical dispersion makes
coordination difficult. In this chapter, I develop a mathematical model of these tradeoffs
and derive testable predictions regarding the type and magnitude of IT investments when
decision rights are delegated or centralized. I then proceed to perform simple empirical
tests of these predictions on a very large dataset. The estimation confirms the predictions
of the model.
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2 IT, Market Efficiency and Geography: Literature
Review
2.1 Market Efficiency
Information technologies have often been regarded as possible drivers of organizational
change both inside the firm and outside it. Indeed, the ability to process and exchange
large amounts of information electronically at very low cost has far-reaching implications
on the structure of firms and markets. In 1987, Malone, Yates and Benjamin examined
how information technology could affect whether economic transactions are coordinated
within or outside the firm. They note that each transaction can be characterized in a two-
dimensional space. One dimension corresponds to the degree of asset specificity
involved in that transaction (the idea is developed in general terms in the transaction-cost
economic tradition such as Williamson (1975, 1985), Klein et al. (1978), and is given
precise operational formalism in the theory of asset ownership of Grossman and Hart,
1986 and Hart and Moore, 1990). Assets that are highly specific to a relationship are
problematic when specifying a complete - and fully enforceable - contract is impossible.
If the product supplied to the client is highly specific to the needs of this client (and has
therefore little value outside the transaction), a supplier will be reluctant to sink
investments ex ante for fear of being held up ex post. The threat of opportunism on the
side of the client leads to market failure: The investment made by the supplier is lower
than what it should be without the threat of opportunism (the optimal investment in the
absence of fears of ex post opportunism is what economists call the first-best outcome).
In such a case, transactions are often better coordinated within the firm than in a market.
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The second dimension that characterizes economic transactions is the degree of
complexity involved in the transaction. The more complicated the process, the more
likely coordination will take place inside the firm.
Information technologies can impact both of these dimensions. Suppose that an
economic transaction is coordinated inside the firm as it entails a high degree of asset
specificity and requires complex data processing activities. Information systems, such as
those supporting flexible manufacturing practices, will allow firms to switch production
lines more quickly, enhancing the alternative value of the asset outside the relationship
and reducing the risk of being "locked" in the relationship ex-post. Similarly, large
databases and query capabilities as well as automation of the production process will
reduce the complexity of the task. Transactions that were formerly coordinated inside the
firm will then move toward market-based coordination. In that sense, IT enables a more
efficient marketplace.
Following this high-level description of how IT will affect the structure in which
economic transactions take place researchers have looked at whether the markets
themselves become more efficient as a result of IT. Market inefficiencies can arise from
information asymmetries and information technologies can reduce these asymmetries by
lowering the costs of finding information. The work of Bakos (1997) in particular
describes how the introduction of an electronic market system can improve buyers'
welfare by providing both price and product information to potential buyers. The
availability of enhanced price information leads to Bertrand-like competition reducing
sellers' margins to zero. The improved availability of product information leads to a gain
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in allocational efficiency due to a better match between sellers and buyers' ideal choices.
In addition, electronic markets provide functions, such as settlement systems and
contractual features that facilitate economic transactions. As a result of these lower
search costs and enhanced transactional environments, competition increases. In these
models, prices converge to zero, consumer surplus increases and markets become more
efficient.
2.2 Empirical Research
Empirical research on the level of prices charged by online sellers gives mixed support to
the theoretical prediction that electronic marketplaces are so efficient that sellers' profits
are nil and buyers' welfare is maximized. On the one hand, Brynjolfsson and Smith
(2000) did find that online retailers of books and CDs charge lower prices than their
brick-and-mortar competitors. On the other hand, they also found substantial price
dispersion in the prices posted by e-tailers and that this dispersion is comparable to the
price dispersion found in conventional markets. Clearly, Internet markets are not as
frictionless as Bakos and others predicted.
Still the effects of the Internet on price are undeniable. Brown and Goolsbee (2002)
matched data on household Internet usage with data on the cost of term life insurance
policies from 1992 to 1997. They found that premiums fell sharply toward the latter half
of that period at about the same time a number of price-comparison Web sites came
online. What's more, the faster a group of households adopted the Internet, the faster the
price of term life insurance fell for that group. Premiums for whole-life insurance
policies, which are not priced on the Web and were not covered by the comparison
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website, did not fall. A possible reason for it is that in the case of life insurance, quote
sites are only a reference source. Potential customers are referred to an agent, and the
actual transaction occurs off-line. But with access to the sites, consumers can get several
quotes in a matter of seconds rather than hours. Not only does the web enable more
efficient pricing and allocations for goods traded online, it also leads to lower prices -
and presumably better match - for goods traded offline.
The effects of IT on market transactions are not always positive. The presence of both
price dispersion among online merchants and lower buyer's search costs exacerbates the
problem of free-riding and can potentially lead to inefficiencies. Merchants that provide
complementary services in addition to the good itself cannot prevent consumers from
using their services and buying the good at a lower price elsewhere. There is then a
disincentive to provide these services since they do not directly generate revenue. But as
manufacturers rely on brick-and-mortar retailers for the promotion of their goods,
manufacturers will both limit the availability of their products online and attempt to
control the pricing of their products over the Internet. In this case, the potential
efficiency gains of the Internet are reduced. Carlton and Chevalier (2001) examine the
decision of manufacturers to offer products online. They consider three categories of
products: fragrances, DVD players, and side by side refrigerators, and find that
manufacturers that limit distribution in the physical world also use various mechanisms to
limit distribution online. In particular, manufacturers attempt to prevent the sale of their
products by online retailers who sell goods at deep discounts. Furthermore,
manufacturers who distribute their goods directly through manufacturer websites tend to
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charge very high prices for the products, consistent with the hypothesis that
manufacturers internalize free rider issues.
2.3 Labor Markets and Location
While considerable research has been devoted to the impact of IT on consumer markets,
the evidence of how the Internet affects the market for factors of production, in particular
the labor market is much scarcer. An exception is a recent paper by Kuhn and Skuterud
(2004) that considers the relationship between internet job search and unemployment
duration. Controlling for observable characteristics among workers, the authors find that
Internet searchers do not have shorter unemployment spells than non-Internet searchers.
Therefore, job matching does not appear to become more efficient in terms of time
through the use of the Internet by job seekers (the "sellers" in Bakos' model).
If the Internet increases the ability of consumers to search for information and results in
efficient matching between buyers and sellers, a reasonable conjecture is that it will also
allow firms to find and hire workers regardless of their location, leading to efficiencies in
the matching of workers to jobs. Indeed, firms' hiring decisions may be non-optimal if
the firm must locate its workers at - or near - its facilities. Reducing firms' dependency
on location would therefore enhance the efficiency of the labor market.
There are several reasons why firms may need to hire workers in specific locations that
are not necessary the lowest-cost. Research on the theory of the multinational enterprise
emphasizes the existence of proprietary assets for explaining the basis for horizontal
multi-plant enterprises. This approach, developed through the work of a number of
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authors including Caves (1971) and Hennart (1982), describes proprietary assets as the
resources that the firm can use but not necessarily contract upon or sell. An asset might
represent knowledge about how to produce a cheaper or better product at given input
prices, or how to produce a given product at a lower cost than competing firms. Assets of
this kind are closely related to the firm-specific resources in the resource-based view of
the firm (Wernerfelt, 1984). These resources form the basis for the firm's competitive
advantage, since they hold a revenue productivity for the firm, closely akin to product
differentiation.
Proprietary assets might affect the ability of multinational firms to locate production
based on production costs. In fact, Maki and Meredith (1986) pointed out that
multinationals might be able to transfer production from a low-cost to a high-cost
location if their proprietary assets include the ability to transfer their source-country cost
advantages. Similarly, the inability of a firm to transfer proprietary assets might hinder
its ability to exploit cost differences and relocate to lower-cost regions.
In that respect, the role of IT is ambiguous. If computer and communication equipment
allows firms unprecedented flexibility in dispersing business units geographically, these
same technologies are also associated with very large intangible investments in
proprietary assets that might not be easily dispersed, such as informal knowledge
networks that are location-dependent. Recent studies showed that each dollar of installed
computer capital in a firm is associated with up to ten dollars of market value, suggesting
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very large investments in other intangible assets (Brynjolfsson, Hitt and Yang, 2002). In
that case, IT could have little effect on the delocalization of tasks that are intangible-
intensive and can in fact increase their relative importance.
In order to crystallize this idea, the following simple general-equilibrium model based on
the Hecksher-Ohlin model of international economics describes how the relative prices of
two types of services change when resource endowments change. Suppose that there are
two types of services: basic services which are well-defined, repetitive tasks that can be
easily monitored and adapted without physical interaction. The second type of service
requires coordination among several divisions of the firm, producers and suppliers, as
well as the exchange of sometimes ambiguous (tacit) and sensitive information. The first
type of service is labor intensive whereas the second type of service is dependent on the
assets of the firm, in particular its intangibles (for example, its reputation or some
innovative business process) but does not require a large amount of labor. Let us call the
first type of service R (routine) and the second type S (skilled). If a firm is limited to
using local labor, demand conditions determine which point on the production function
will be chosen. Consider now what happens when service R can be provided at a
distance at a lower cost: as labor employed in service R becomes more abundant, output
declines in locally-provided service R and expands in service S. Local service R
discharges a lot of labor, thereby raising the rental price of the firm's intangible assets
that are location-specific. As the value of the local assets increases, the firm's valuation
of location becomes more important and employment in service S goes up as well.
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This simple model shows that IT can have a positive effect on the relative value of local
employment. In order to analyze these effects, an empirical evaluation of the role of IT
on localization decisions is necessary.
2.4 Outsourcing
Although this question is essential in order to understand the potential of outsourcing and
off-shoring in the economy, most of the previous research on outsourcing has not been
concerned with location issues but rather with the contracting aspect of outsourcing
business functions to a third party, building on the traditional economic frameworks of
transaction cost economics. Ang and Straub (1998) studied 243 U.S. banks outsourcing
decisions and the factors considered by these banks when making their decision. They
found that production costs (the amount of money a customer pays the vendor for its
services) is given six times more emphasis than transaction costs. Companies were
focusing on achieving a production cost advantage, which is the difference between what
it costs to keep a specific function in house and what a vendor charges, but neglected to
take into account the potentially significant transaction costs. Their findings supported
the research conducted by Gurbaxani & Whang (1991) that had already suggested that
firms should perform specific business functions in-house only if the transaction costs
associated with arranging for such services in the marketplace exceed the production cost
savings to be achieved from outsourcing it (see also Loh & Venkatraman, 1992b;
Applegate & Montealegre, 1991).
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The idea that IT vendors hold considerable economies of scale in procuring IT services
has led managers to "jump on the outsourcing bandwagon" (Lacity and Hirschheim,
1993): as IT spending is mostly not accounted for as an investment but as an overhead
cost (last chapter of this thesis), companies are seeking to reduce these costs by
outsourcing the IT function: if companies do not "maintain their own power supply",
then "why shouldn't they do the same for IT?" (Venkatraman and Loh, 1994)
At the same time, researchers have become aware of the difficulties involved in
managing the outsourcing relationship: Earl (1996) identified some of the problems that
may occur - such as hidden costs, failure to implement new technology innovations,
failure to pass on cost savings to the client, arguments regarding contract details and
interpretation of performance metrics. In addition, there is a risk of loss of competitive
advantage as the result of the transfer of key business or strategic knowledge from the
client to the vendor.
The outsourcing of a business function is therefore subject to risks and failures, and
researchers have attempted to determine how to best manage the IT outsourcing
relationship (see for instance the "Four Outsourcing Relationship Types" of Kishore,
Rao, Nam, Rajagopalan and Chaudhury, 2003) over time. Information technologies can
help manage this relationship. As described above, coordination costs include
information search costs, communication costs and monitoring costs and the Internet can
reduce these costs. In particular, the ability to exchange large amounts of information
quickly reduces communication costs and enables clients to monitor vendors and projects
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more closely, thereby offering the means to verify and enforce a contract ex-post in the
event of a dispute.
Since most of the research on IT outsourcing has focused on the buyer-vendor
relationship, it has naturally ignored the issues that arise from the geographical dispersion
of work (between business units of the same firm that are geographically distant).
Certainly, the emphasis on the contractual issues that are inherent in such buyer-vendor
relationships is warranted, given that IT outsourcing is by definition the "contracting of
various information systems functions such as managing of data centers, operations,
hardware support, software maintenance, network, and even application development to
outside service providers" (Chaudhury, Nam and Rao, 1995). But the more basic
question of location (or rather dispersion) of work which is implicit but dwarfed by the
associated contracting/incentive problems of outsourcing to a third party, has not been
considered. Certainly, research on IT outsourcing yields valuable insights on how to
coordinate work between firms, some of which can be applied to the coordination of
work between geographically dispersed units of the same firm. The observation that IT
lowers coordination costs, for example, has implications for coordinating activities both
between firms and inside the firm. Other factors however are less important when
dispersing work within a firm than across organizational boundaries. For instance, recent
research has suggested that trust is an essential pre-condition to developing strategic
alliances and partnerhips (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1997; Fitzgerald & Willcocks,
1994) but is clearly less of an issue when transactions are taking place within the same
firm. If IT is found to affect trust, its impact on coordinating work within the firm will be
different from between firms. It is therefore important to understand the relationship
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between IT and de-location independently of the ownership structure in which
transactions take place.
Another aspect of the literature on IT outsourcing is that it is concerned mainly with the
outsourcing of the IT function. Clearly, the insights gained by looking at the IT function
are valuable when looking at other business functions, but even within the outsourcing
framework, researchers have noted that circumstances, industries, and objectives matter a
great deal in structuring the relationship. For instance, Marcolin & McLellan (1998)
show that the nature of the IT outsourcing relationship is rooted in industry and
organizational factors such as the client's business and IT objectives, the level of
uncertainty in their industry as well as "interpretation strictness" -- how tightly or loosely
the actual contract is observed in day-to-day practice. Therefore, both the structuring of
the outsourcing relationship and its management may be different for business functions
other than the IT function.
2.5 IT and Business Process Automation
Whether outsourcing, off-shoring or de-locating work among different business units,
companies face the issue of how to define the processes that they are "exporting" to
distant geographical areas so that they can still remain integrated with the remainder of
the firm's business. In that respect, IT has a dual role: on the one hand, fast
communication of large amount of information enables various organizational units to
exchange up-to-date information and act upon this information in real-time. The
exponentially decreasing costs of communication render the strategy of coordinating
work across many different locations feasible and efficient. Similarly, lower costs for
21
faster central processing units, large data storage systems and enhanced multimedia
capabilities make it cost-effective to computerize even the most basic business functions,
which can then be sited anywhere.
On the other hand, IT and the automation process with which it is associated require
processes inside the firm to be clearly defined, monitored and managed. In fact, in a
recent survey of large manufacturing firms (reported at the end of this thesis), a majority
of respondents cited "visibility" as one of their main objective in implementing a large
enterprise-wide computerization effort. While information systems may constrain their
users by imposing specific ways of doing things, they also help for the same reason,
structuring, defining, and representing the informal and (often) poorly-structured
processes on which work is based. Simon (1960) noted that it is sometimes possible to
extend the extent of computer substitution by simplifying the task. In other words,
complex tasks can be broken down into simpler tasks, which can then be described using
rule-based logic and step-by-step instructions. Conversely, for a task to be automated, it
will need to first be described in procedural steps. For instance, Levy and Murnane
(2004) describe how a mortgage underwriter processes applications using explicit rules.
There is a rule governing the maximum loan size, a rule that includes test on the
applicant's liquid assets, job tenure, monthly income etc... More flexible rules can be
designed by assigning points to various items, so that the underwriter calculates a
weighted score on the basis of which the decision to grant the mortgage is taken.
Structuring a process so that it can be expressed in terms of premises and logical rules is
a pre-requisite to automating it.
22
2.6 The Death of Distance
In such an environment, one might predict that computers will lead to what has been
hailed as the "death of distance" (Cainrcross, 1997). Sassen (1998) considers what the
death of distance means for government/businesses structures and how citizens perceive
the world. Building on Beninger (1989) and Yates (1993)'s work on communication in
organizations, she explores how the death of distance both allows management-at-a-
distance and encourages concentration of elites within the 'latte belt'.
Management-at-a-distance requires the use of computerized systems and of the Internet,
in particular, to both find and set up the most cost-effective allocation of labor across
geographical regions, as well as to coordinate this work seamlessly across the enterprise.
The explosion of such computer-based systems and the dramatic decrease in their costs
naturally suggests that firms will be increasingly capable to "free" themselves from the
tyranny of location (Blainey, 1966).
2.7 The Economics of Location
Yet economists have long realized that location decisions entail externalities. In fact,
agglomeration patterns in the "new economic geography" models (Krugman, 1991,
Fujita, Krugman and Venables, 1999) are based on the presence of pecuniary
externalities. The characteristics of these models include consumers with preferences for
diversity in consumption, monopolistically competitive firms producing differentiated
products, increasing returns to scale at the firm level and transportation costs. In these
models, agglomeration arises from a self-reinforcing loop: locations with high demand
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for a good attract producers of that good, which in turn require additional employees,
generating even higher demand for all goods at that location, making it even more
attractive to other producers. Moreover, as consumers value diversity, they prefer to live
in a city where many producers have located so that more variety is available at lower
prices.
The presence of externalities linked to location patterns provide an intriguing way to
account for some of the productivity growth in firms and in the economy. Standard
economic models of growth (the neo-classical growth model of Solow (1956) and Swan
(1956)) posit a production function with two inputs, labor and capital, and an additional
term, the total factor productivity (also called the Solow residual). In this type of models,
growth in a firm or in the economy is either determined endogenously by growth in
factors of production, depending on the saving (and therefore consumption) choices in
the system, or exogenously by growth in the total factor productivity. In the neo-
classical growth model, output growth that is not explained by input growth is externally
determined by changes in this productivity term. For instance, technological change is
not explained in the neo-classical growth model but is accounted for solely in the TFP
factor. In an attempt to explain technical change, economists have proposed new models
of economic growth in which output growth is directly related to the growth in the TFP.
In a series of papers, including a famous one in 1962 with J.A. Mirlees, Kaldor posited
the existence of a "technical progress" function such that per capita income was indeed an
increasing function of per capita investment. Thus "learning" is regarded as a function of
the rate of increase in investment. The more an economy (or a firm) invests, the more
learning it will generate. Similarly, Arrow (1962) took on the view that the level of the
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"learning" coefficient is a function of cumulative investment (i.e., past gross investment).
In this specification, investment does not only induce productivity growth of labor on
existing capital (as Kaldor would have it), but it also improves the productivity of labor
upon all subsequent machines made in the economy. If firms face constant returns to
scale for all inputs together (as in a Cobb-Douglas production function), it might seem as
if output per capita and consumption per capita does not grow unless the exogenous TFP
factor grows too (a central part of the Solow model which is supported by the facts).
However if knowledge, as Arrow argued is common to all firms (a free and public good)
there will be increasing returns at the level of the economy. In other words, there are
externalities to knowledge accumulation in the economy that are not internalized
individually by firms.
In this model (and the models that follow such as Romer, 1986) the nature of the
externality is in knowledge creation. But we have seen above that location is also a
source of externalities. In fact, several other economic models also describe the
externalities that arise from location decisions. In production externality models for
instance, firms' production possibilities depend on the actions of other firms at the same
location via knowledge spillovers (see for example, Berliant, Peng and Wang (2002),
Fujita and Ogawa (1982), Henderson (1974, 1988)). Firms want to locate their activities
where other firms are because they derive benefits from this proximity. Similarly, natural
advantage models emphasize differences in resource endowments between regions:
certain regions are then more attractive to certain types of producers. Firms that value a
particular feature, such as proximity to a body of water or soil will concentrate at
locations with more of that feature.
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Empirical research has shown that these externalities are economically significant.
Ellison and Glaeser (1999) looked at four-digit manufacturing industries and found that
industry location can be explained in part by resource and labor-market natural
advantages (costs). For some highly agglomerated industries though, inter-firm
spillovers are found to be much more important (the fur industry for instance, the most
agglomerated industry in their sample, is concentrated in the New York area).
Accounting for these types of externalities is important in studying the possible
substitution effects between IT and location. If firms benefit from agglomeration
economies, the Internet may not substitute for the advantages of cities. Kolko (1999)
used data on domain-name (web) density in metropolitan statistical areas of the US to
show that city size is positively associated with the use of the Internet, suggesting that the
two are complement, not substitutes. In addition to a positive relationship between city
size and domain density, the author finds that isolated cities have higher domain density:
remote cities benefit more from the web. These findings suggest that web usage and
face-to-face communication are complementary and not substitutes, but that the Internet
may substitute for longer-distance, non-electronic communication.
In this vein, Leamer and Storper (2001) discuss the ambiguous impact of IT in changing
location patterns. Building on the historical perspective of how lower transportation
costs enabled the dispersion of routine activities but also increased the complexity and
time-dependence of productive activity (therefore favoring agglomeration), they argue
that the Internet will produce similar opposite forces. They note that "it is common for
specialized immaterial producers to have branch offices in major cities, near the location
of deployment of (these) ideas, suggesting that the "shipping" of an intellectual product
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may be as costly as shipping a tire axle." Trust, understanding and informal relationships
require complex uncodifiable messages that are hard to transmit over electronic media.
Similarly, new products incorporate an extensive amount of complex uncodifiable
information.
In support of this hypothesis, Saxenian (1996) studies the organization of production in
California's Silicon Valley and other technology regions. She argues that Silicon Valley
surpassed its East Coast counterpart in the 1980s because the region developed an
industrial system that enabled businesses to be more flexible, adaptive and innovative.
The rich social, technical and productive relationships in the region fostered
entrepreneurship, experimentation, and collective learning. As a result, the region's
infrastructure was as critical to the successes of local firms as their own individual
activities.
2.8 Summary
This chapter has reviewed the literature concerning the impact of IT on the efficiency of
consumer markets and argued that the findings of this literature may be applicable to
labor markets. In labor markets, as in consumer markets, there exist market frictions that
shift the market equilibrium away from the intersection of supply and demand (i.e., the
competitive equilibrium). In the case of factors of production, one needs to consider both
how IT impacts work inside firms (including the automation of tasks) and how firms rely
on the externalities they derive from their factor location choices which might lead to a
non-competitive equilibrium. The chapter provided a short review of the literature on
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each one of these topics. The next chapter presents the statistical background on which
the estimation in this research builds.
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3 Discrete Choice Models
In order to estimate the relationship between firm's IT investments and location
decisions, I used data about location characteristics, firm characteristics and decision
choices for a sample of 104 firms. The statistical framework used in this research is
based on a model of choice by firms. This chapter presents the background necessary in
order to understand how choice models work and what the assumptions underlying these
types of models are.
3.1 Overview
Firms face decisions every day. Examples of production choices include choice of a
technology, the product lines to produce, the output levels of these product lines, the
input mix needed to achieve these levels, the marketing (pricing, advertising
expenditures) strategy. Among the production decisions that firms must make is the
decision of where to locate workers. Typically, this decision will depend on a variety of
factors, one of them being the unit costs of an additional worker in a specific location.
Suppose that the outcome of this decision is denoted as y, a vector that specifies the
number of workers hired in each possible location. Since the number of workers and the
set of options (locations) are finite, this is a discrete choice problem. A possible value for
this vector for example could be a hundred workers in Iowa, fifty-six workers in
Massachusetts, and none in any of the other possible locations. Our goal is to specify the
behavioral process that leads to these choices.
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The basis for discrete choice models is the assumption that behavior depends on the
characteristics of the alternatives and not on each alternative per se. The dimensionality
of the choice problem is therefore reduced to the dimensionality of the set of
characteristics. This approach (pioneered by Lancaster, 1966) states that it is the
attributes of the goods that determine utility, not the goods themselves. Unfortunately,
we cannot completely specify the exhaustive set of characteristics that influence firms'
location and hiring choices. Some factors are idiosyncratic to the firm and simply not
observable by the researcher: for instance, management characteristics or special
incentives given to a firm in order to locate in a specific region are not observable. Luce
(] 959) and Marschak (1960) introduced the concept of random utility in consumer choice
to capture the fact that utility is intrinsically probabilistic since some of the attributes that
determine the choice are not observable by the researcher. The attributes (observable and
unobservable) relate to the firm's choice through a function y = h(X, E) where Xare the
observable factors and c are the unobservables. Notice that the function is deterministic
if both X and c are known. If c is not observed though, only the probability of a choice
vector y can be estimated, not its exact value.
Discrete choice models place various distributional and independence assumptions on the
unobservables so that the probability that the firm will choose a specific location and
hiring decision is determined by the probability of the unobserved factors, given the
observed characteristics.
A choice model relates the characteristics of the choice situation to the choice made by
the decision maker through the function h. In this sense, h is simply the mapping
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between the value of the attributes of the alternative and the decision. The mechanics of
choice however involve a latent variable which in consumer choice models corresponds
to the utility the consumer derives from each alternative (or in the case of a firm the profit
of the firm from choosing the alternative). Decision makers maximize this latent variable
(utility or profit) and the choice y represents the outcome of this implicit optimization
process. A discrete choice model can thus be thought of in terms of utility-maximizing
(or profit maximizing) on the side of the decision maker. The (indirect) utilities are latent
variables and the actual choice, which is observed, is directly related to the underlying
(unobserved) utilities. Note that although the derivation of the choice probabilities is
consistent with utility maximization it may also be consistent with other forms of
behavior.
3.2 The Mechanics of Discrete Choice Models
To understand how discrete choice models work, consider a decision maker who faces J
alternatives. If the decision maker chooses one of the alternatives, it will derive a certain
utility from this choice. Given that we do not observe all the attributes that enter the
choice, we cannot observe the utility (or profit) from that choice. However, since we
know which alternative was chosen, we also know that the utility, factoring in the
unobservables, was higher for that alternative than for any other alternative. Therefore,
conditional on the value of the observed variables, the probability that an alternative is
chosen is determined by the distribution of the unobserved component of the utility. The
nature of the distributional assumptions placed on the unobserved component of the
utility lead to different types of choice models. Logit models for instance, assume that
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these components are distributed independently and identically across alternatives and
decision makers and follow the type I extreme value distribution.
Once the unobserved portion of the utility is specified, the choice probabilities of each
alternative follow. Indeed, the probability of choosing one alternative over another is
simply a function of the difference between the two random components of the utility of
each alternative. Given the distributional assumptions placed on these components, the
probability is fully characterized, up to a multiplicative and additive constant.
The utility that a decision maker derives from alternativej is U j = Vj + e, where Vj is
the representative utility and incorporates the observed attributes of the alternative, and j
is the random term among the population and is not observed. This decomposition is
fully general and simply states that j is the difference between the true utility Uj and the
part of the utility Vj that we can observe. The distribution of cj will then depends on the
specification for V1. Denote the joint density of the vector e= <j... Ej> byf(E), then the
probability that alternative i is chosen is given by:
Pi = Pr(Ui > UkVk i) = Pr(V + ei > Vk + ekVk i) = Pr(Ei -E k > Vk- V)
=J I( i- k > Vk - V)Vi k)f(E)de (1)
where I() is the indicator function equal to 1 when the expression in parentheses is true
and 0 otherwise. This multidimensional integral takes a closed form for certain
specification of the distribution of the error term. For instance, the logit model is derived
under the assumption that the components of E are distributed i.i.d extreme value. The
critical part of the assumption is that the unobserved factors are uncorrelated across
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alternatives and have the same variance. Another model, probit, assumes that the error
term is multivariate normal. The advantage of a probit model is that the
variance/covariance matrix is not restricted and can capture any correlation pattern or
heteroskedasticity across alternatives. The disadvantage is that whereas the logit model
has a closed form for the integral in (1), probit does not admit a closed form and the
resulting integral must be evaluated numerically or through simulation.
Under the logit assumption, McFadden (1974) showed that the integral in (1) can be
reduced to the following simple form:
v
,
eP, ~e~ j (2)
Note that Pi has all the properties of a probability: it is necessarily between zero and one,
is asymptotically 0 when Vi tends to - oo, and sums up to 1 across all alternatives.
3.3 Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives
The assumption of independence in the logit model is sometimes inappropriate. For
example, a person who dislikes traffic jams when driving her own car may have the same
reaction to taking the bus, as opposed to commuting via underground rail. The problem
is that the independence assumption between the unobserved components of the utility
implies proportional substitution patterns across alternatives, given the specification of
the representative utility. When the value of an alternative improves (i.e., one observed
attribute that positively enters the utility increases) the probability of choosing this
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alternative rises. Since the probabilities sum up to one, some people who would have
chosen other alternatives will switch to this alternative. Substitution patterns capture the
extent to which the introduction of a new alternative draws customers away from another
alternative. Substitution coefficients also reflect the shape of the demand function. In the
logit specification, substitution patterns are restricted: this feature is called the
independence from irrelevant alternatives.
In order to understand what independence from irrelevant alternatives is, consider two
alternatives and the associated probabilities of choosing these alternatives in a logit
model. Given the functional form of the probabilities, the ratio of these probabilities is
independent of any other alternative (the denominator in (2) cancels out). As a
consequence, the relative likelihood of choosing one alternative over another does not
change no matter which other alternatives are available. Chipman (1960) and Debreu
(1960) present situations when the IIA property is not realistic. The most famous
example is the red-bus-blue-bus problem. A traveler faces two possible ways to get to
work: either take a red bus or drive. Assume that the representative utility (the part of the
utility function that depends only on observable attributes) for the two modes of
transportation is the same. In this case, the ratio of the two probabilities (taking the bus
versus driving) is one. If a new alternative - a blue bus - is introduced, the traveler must
have the same preferences for the red or the blue bus, so that the ratio of the probability
of taking the blue bus to taking the red bus is one. However, the logit model implies that
the ratio of the probabilities between two alternatives does not depend on which other
alternatives are available. Therefore, the ratio of probabilities between driving and taking
the red bus remains one. Given that both the ratio of probabilities between driving and
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taking the red bus and the ratio of probabilities between taking the blue bus and the red
bus are one, the three probabilities (taking the red blue, the blue bus and driving) after the
introduction of the new alternative "red bus" must be 1/3. It is however much more
realistic to expect that the red bus will not change the probability of driving. In other
words, a much more realistic pattern would be for the probability of driving to remain
1/'2, and the probability of taking each of the buses to be 1/4. In this case, the logit model
overstates the probability of taking a bus and understates the probability of driving.
In general, if the ratio of probabilities (how much more likely one is to choose alternative
A over B) changes with the introduction or change of another alternative, the logit model
is inappropriate. This will happen if the new alternative is expected to reduce the number
of people choosing A by a greater proportion than it reduces the number of people
choosing B. The same issue is apparent when one looks at the cross-elasticities of
substitution of the logit probabilities. It is easy to see that the elasticity of Pi with respect
to an attribute z that enters the utility of alternativej is Ei,z, = -zZjPi, where zj is the
attribute of alternativej that changes and fiz is the coefficient on zj in the utility function
for alternativej. Notice that this cross-elasticity is independent of i: the substitution
away (or into) i resulting from a change in the utility ofj is the same for all i. It also
implies that alternativej draws proportionately from (or, in the case that the utility ofj
increases, contributes proportionately to) all the other alternatives equally.
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3.4 Alternative Modeling
This shortcoming has led to the development of alternative models that preserve the
extreme-value distribution without assuming full independence between alternatives.
The Generalized extreme-value (GEV) models allow correlation in unobserved factors
over alternatives. The most commonly used model of this family, the nested logit model
(Ben Akiva, 1973), partitions the alternatives into subsets, or nests, such that the
assumption of independence from irrelevant alternatives is preserved between
alternatives that belong to the same nests but not, in general, between alternatives in
different nests. The nested logit model is obtained by assuming that the vector of
unobserved utility E has cumulative distribution
K
exp(-E ( E e-_k ),t, ) (3
k=l jeBk
,k is a measure of the correlation between alternatives in nest k. Notice that as ,k gets
close to 1, the correlation decreases, and when k = 1, all the alternatives in nest k are
independent. In this case the model collapses to the standard logit model. More complex
forms allow essentially any pattern of correlation. The usefulness of nested logit models
arises from the fact that one can easily derive a closed-form expression for the
probabilities (see Ben Akiva, 1973):
a e v / ),-
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Does independence from irrelevant alternatives hold for nested-logit models? The ratio of
the probabilities of two alternatives i and m depends on whether they belong to the same
nest or not. If i and m are in the same nest, then the ratio is only dependent on these two
alternatives. If i and m are not in the same nest, the ratio of probabilities depends on the
attributes of all alternatives in the nests to which i and m belong. Therefore, nested logit
relaxes the independence from irrelevant alternatives by allowing dependence between
nests. Still, nested logit retains the assumption of independence from alternatives in nests
not containing i and m.
Nested logit models are still limited in a number of ways: first, one needs to decide how
to allocate the alternatives between nests and levels. Clearly, alternatives should be
grouped according to how similar we believe they are on the unobserved characteristics.
But by definition, we cannot know exactly whether the grouping is appropriate (since the
characteristics are unobservable). To address this issue, some more recent work on
nested logit allows alternatives to overlap between nests (Vovsha, 1997). A more serious
limitation however that is inherent to both the logit and the nested logit models is their
inability to represent variations in taste between decision makers. This is an important
restriction: the value that decision makers place on each attribute of the alternatives is
often dependent on the decision maker. For example, when choosing a residential area in
which to live, some people may prefer quiet neighborhoods whereas others will enjoy
living in a vibrant lively neighborhood. Logit models (and by extension, nested logit
models) cannot represent random taste variations. The following class of models, the
probit models, can deal with random taste variations.
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3.5 Random Taste Variation
Probit models are derived under the assumption of jointly normal unobserved utility
components. As for the logit specification, utility is decomposed into observed and
unobserved components, but since the density of the unobserved component is normal,
the integral in (2) does not have a closed form. It must therefore be evaluated through
simulation. The flexibility of the model however allows for any type of variance-
covariance matrix. Since the independence of irrelevant alternatives property was
associated with the restrictions of the logit model on the distribution of the error term,
probit, by relaxing these assumptions allows the researcher to specify and estimate any
substitution patterns. Substitution coefficients are obtained by estimating the variance-
covariance matrix of the unobserved component of the utility. The main advantage of the
probit model is that it can incorporate random tastes via random coefficients (Hausman
and Wise, 1978). Random coefficients arise when the coefficients that affect the
observed portion of the utility are not fixed but are distributed in the population according
to some distribution whose parameters are to be estimated. In other words, tastes are not
identical across decision makers in the population but are distributed according to some
predetermined distribution. In this case, the utility of alternativej can be represented as
Ui = b'X + Pj.X/+ j where b is the mean of the random coefficients A, X are
observable attributes and /3 is the deviation of the random coefficient from its mean b.
The last two terms are random. Note that if P and E are normally distributed the
unobservable component Pj X + E is also normal. In this case, the model is simply a
probit specification with restrictions placed on the unobserved component of the utility
(the variance-covariance matrix). In particular, the covariance matrix of the unobserved
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components depends both on the covariance of the P and on Xj. As a result, the
covariance differs over decision makers.
3.6 Discrete Choice Models in the Empirical Literature
Discrete choice models have been used in many applications since they were introduced
in the late seventies (Heckman, 1978, Dubin and McFadden, 1984). Most of the
applications of discrete choice models are concerned with analyzing consumer choice.
An early example of the power of these models was given by McFadden et al. (1977).
The authors applied logit models to predict commuters' mode choices in the San
Francisco Bay area. A new rail system, the Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) had been
built and mode choice models were estimated on a sample of consumers to determine the
factors that enter commuters' decisions, including the value of time savings. The models
were then used to forecast the choices that the sampled commuters would make once
BART became available. After BART was open, the commuters were re-contacted and
their mode choices were observed. The predicted share of commuters taking BART was
compared with the observed share. The models predicted quite well, far more accurately
than the procedures used by BART consultants who had not used discrete choice models.
The most prominent usage of discrete choice models is in analyzing differentiated
product markets. Discrete choice models allow the estimation of supply-demand models
in markets with product differentiation in which consumer utility depends on product
characteristics and individual taste parameters. Berry at al. (1996) estimate cost and
demand effects of airline hubbing: a hubbing airline's ability to raise prices is focused on
tickets that appeal to price-inelastic business travelers. These travelers, who favor the
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origin-hub airline, are found to be ready to pay an average premium of 20% for flights
originating from the hub.
A market to which discrete choice models have been extensively applied is the
automobile market. Lave and Train (1979) used a multinomial logit model that includes
variables such as household attributes, vehicle characteristics as well as gasoline prices.
Manski and Sherman (1980) developed multinomial logit models for the number of
vehicles owned and vehicle type choice: they specify separate models of automobile type
choice for households with one or two vehicles in their fleet. Mannering and Wilson
(1985) model the number of vehicles, vehicle type and vehicle usage in a nested logit
framework. In the first level, consumers decide on the number of vehicles and vehicle
types. The second level includes continuous vehicle usage variables from earlier time
periods. The estimation is restricted to single or two-vehicle households. Both papers
assume an extreme value distribution for the error term so that nested logit models can be
used. In a seminal paper, Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) provide a complete demand
framework for the automobile industry that incorporates choice models with random
coefficients using aggregate data. This framework enables one to obtain estimates of
demand and cost parameters for a class of oligopolistic differentiated products markets.
These estimates can be obtained using only widely available product-level and aggregate
consumer-level data, and they are consistent with a structural model of equilibrium in an
oligopolistic industry. Applying these techniques, the authors obtain parameters for
essentially all automobiles sold over a twenty year period.
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In a different domain, Train, McFadden and Ben-Akiva (1987) analyze the demand for
local telephone service options (for example, between flat-rate and measured service) and
the interrelation of these choices with the number and average duration of local calls
households make at each time of day to each geographical zone. In order to perform the
estimation on a randomly selected subset of the households' calling patterns, they assume
an extreme value distribution of the error terms and specify choice behavior in a nested
logit framework. This enables them to calculate elasticities of demand for each local
service option, number of calls, average duration, and revenues, with respect to the fixed
monthly charges and the usage charges for calling under each option. They find
moderate price elasticities of number of calls with respect to usage charges for
households subscribing to measured service. Nevertheless, raising usage charges has a
negligible effect on revenues, since a sufficient number of households either originally
subscribe to flat-rate service or convert to flat-rate service in response to higher usage
charges. High elasticity of demand for each service option with respect to its fixed
monthly fee indicates high substitutability among service options.
3.7 Summary
The papers reviewed in this chapter show the versatility of discrete choice models in
representing consumer choices. In this research, I apply the logic of discrete choice
models to firms' choices of locations for customer service representatives. In order to
account for flexible substitution patterns and random tastes, I specify the model as a
choice model with random coefficients. The next chapter describes the domain and the
model for this study.
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4 Study Domain and Mathematical Model
The previous discussion has shown the usefulness of discrete choice models in analyzing
the demand systems of differentiated product markets. In this research I adopt and
extend the framework to firms' hiring and location choices among differentiated regions.
Firms choose where to locate their employees based on the characteristics of the region
and their own characteristics. Given this framework, the relationship between the
importance of regional characteristics and IT investments can then be examined.
4.1 The Domain
As shown in previous productivity studies, there are significant advantages to studying IT
effects at the firm level whenever possible. For instance, firm-level data analysis has
unveiled the impact of IT on productivity where aggregate-level analysis had only found
a productivity "paradox" (Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 2003). Even more insightful are studies
of a specific function or process across firms. Narrowing the research domain to a
specific well-defined process increases the confidence one has in the accuracy of the
econometric results (Ichniowski and Shaw, 2003). For this reason, I focus on
manufacturing firms and on one service, archetypical of information work: customer
service representatives (CSR) answering customer calls. This type of service consists in
providing information to customers on the phone, including processing orders and
providing solutions to common questions and inquiries. It is also a good example of a
footloose process that in principle can be sited anywhere. This makes it an ideal
candidate to investigate in order to gain an understanding of how information
technologies may impact the location of information work. I analyze the choices of firms
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in locating customer service representatives across various US geographical locations.
Firms choose where to locate their CSRs (the analogue to consumers choosing which
products to buy in a differentiated product setting) and how many CSRs to hire at each
location (how many units of each product to purchase).
In addition to providing a restricted domain in which decisions about hiring and location
of work can be analyzed, focusing on phone-based customer service has an additional
advantage. Telephone call centers are an integral part of many businesses and their
economic role is significant and growing. Moreover, the management literature in
operations research has studied the interaction between system design (such as the
number of employees answering calls) and system performance. Models are inherently
simplifications of the operations of the real world but they provide more accurate
representations of the way variables in a system interact than the usual linear
specification of utility function in traditional models of consumer choice. In the
following, I describe the model used to derive the profit of a telephone-based customer
service function at a firm.
At the core of the model is a view of customer service as comprised of two related
stochastic processes: the arrival process, whereby calls generated randomly by customers
reach one of the CSRs at the company, and the service process which corresponds to the
time and effort that the CSR puts into answering a call. Call arrivals are unpredictable
and vary over time. Likewise, service time is also a non-deterministic function of a
variety of control variables. In planning capacity, managers take into consideration
whether hiring an additional CSR will improve performance at the firm. In doing so,
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they need to define a performance measure and examine the marginal benefits and costs
of hiring an additional CSR. One such measure, accessibility, is the operational
performance related to measurable output such as the time customers have to wait to
speak to an agent or the number of customers who abandoned the queue before being
serviced. Typically, service operations aim to maximize accessibility net of hiring costs.
In my model, I directly relate accessibility to revenue by drawing on the observation that
customers whose waiting time is too long are likely to abandon the queue (Mandelbaum
et al. (2002) present empirical evidence on the relationship between waiting times and
queue abandonment). Lost customers translate into a loss of future revenue stream.
Equivalently, higher levels of accessibility are associated with higher net present value of
revenue.
It should be noted that alternative revenue measures could also be used. Service quality
can be assessed on the basis of the effectiveness of service, or how "well" a call has been
answered. This measure parallels the notion of rework in the manufacturing literature
and is typically measured by sampling inspection. Similarly, the content of the CSRs'
interactions with customers (whether or not the CSR was polite, friendly etc...) is often
monitored. Both measures are harder to integrate into a capacity-management model and
I do not consider them any further. It is clear however that these types of measures play a
role in hiring and allocation decisions of customer service representatives at some
companies.
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4.2 The Model
Consider a model in which a single type of calls is handled by a number of CSRs at a
firm. The arrival process records the times at which calls arrive to the firm. Arrival rates
depend on many factors - day of the week, marketing and advertising operations etc...
Classical theoretical models posit that arrivals form a Poisson process, which can be
justified with the following behavioral argument. Suppose that there exist many
potential, statistically identical callers and that there is a non-zero small probability of
each one of them calling the firm. In the case of a manufacturing firm for instance, each
purchased product may have a (hopefully small) independent probability of a defect and
each customer will call the firm given a defect with some probability p. This implies that
callers decide to call the firm independently of each other and as a consequence, the
aggregate number of calls to the firm can be shown to follow a Poisson process. It is
important to realize that forecasts of arrival rates are necessarily inexact and a rough
approximation of the real arrival rate. The important point though is not whether arrival
rates are an accurate representation of the stochastic process but rather whether they
adequately capture the arrival variables that enter the decision process of the decision
makers at the firm. The assumption in this model is that they do. Moreover,
Mandelbaum (2000) shows that the Poisson distribution is a good approximation of the
actual distribution of calls in a call center context.
The firm chooses where to locate its CSRs. However, I assume that the locations are
pooled together in providing service. In other words, calls are dispatched to any of the
CSRs that are available firm-wide. This is commonly achieved through the use of
45
networking technologies that "virtually" pool together geographically dispersed service
centers and allow calls to be routed to different sites. The routing can be based on some
priority (hierarchical) scheme. The reason firms may still want to locate CSRs at many
different sites is that the characteristics of the location may influence the overall service
that the agents at that site provide. For instance, agents physically close to the rest of the
firm's activities may benefit from this proximity. The service rate of these agents will
then be higher than that of other agents located at other sites, ceteris paribus. On the
other hand, it is also possible that proximity has no bearing on the agent's productivity.
Perhaps economies of scale associated with large suburban call centers are much more
important in driving regional productivity differences. In order to capture potential
regional effects, the model allows the service rate to vary across regions.
Capturing proximity benefits through higher service rates is not as restrictive as it may
seem. First, the profit function from customer care is directly related to the quality of
service provided by the firm. In a queueing model, firms influence QOS by hiring more
workers. The model presented here allows the productivity of each additional worker to
depend on the benefits of proximity. It is therefore a richer specification than a typical
queueing process. Second, additional dimensions of service quality can be conceptually
related to higher service rates. For instance, a worker who provides a more accurate
answer to a customer inquiry is servicing both the current customer and future calls that
this customer would have placed had the answer to her inquiry been less accurate. In
operational terms, the service rate has increased.
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The most frequently used parametric model of service is that of exponentially distributed
durations. The justification for its use can be found in a series of empirical studies that
compared empirical distributions of service durations to exponential distributions and
found an acceptable fit. Kort (1983) summarized models of the Bell System Public
Switched Telephone Network, developed in the 70s and 80s. Harris et al. (1987)
analyzed IRS call centers. Both found the exponential distribution to be an acceptable
approximation for the distribution of the service duration.
In summary, the two basic building blocks of the stochastic model that describes
customer service at the firm are the call arrivals and the customer service provided by
CSRs. Arrivals at the firm follow a Poisson process with mean f that depends on the
characteristics of the firm Df. Service times are distributed exponentially with parameter
Af. The combination of these two processes characterizes the stochastic environment of
the model.
Given these processes, I can specify the profit function of providing customer service for
the firm. The profit function plays the role of the utility function in classic discrete
choice models, but unlike many of these models in which the utility function is a simple
arbitrary linear form of the product characteristics, the functional form of the profit
function is derived directly from the primitive components of the stochastic queueing
model outlined above. Using a queueing model to specify the profit function allows me
to provide an approximation of the marginal value of hiring an additional worker in a
specific location. Clearly, the marginal value of an additional worker is a function of the
number of workers already hired at the firm, and the total number of calls that the firm
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receives. The queueing model incorporates both the call arrival process and the service
process to derive a profit function whose characteristics are more realistic than a simple
linear utility function.
Recall that calls arriving at the firm are routed to one of the available agents (regardless
of location) or are placed in the queue, waiting for the next available agent. Given a
firm's staffing strategy and system load, callers may have to wait in line for the next
available agent a long time, and some will drop. Negative impact on customer
satisfaction that results from long waiting times and its counterpart, higher satisfaction
that results from long waiting times and its counterpart, higher retention rates from quick
and efficient service, define a measure of revenue from customer service, Rf. I assume
that a call that drops is a loss in revenue. Firmf then chooses the number of agents
Xf and their locations i to minimize staffing costs and revenue loss from dropped calls.
7f = R - x P. (5)
where i is indexing the different regions where the firm locates its CSRs, X f is the
choice variable (number of CSRs in region i) and Pi is the unit costs of locating a CSR in
region i.
The revenue function Rf can be given an explicit form by using the Pollaczek-Khinchin
formula (Gallagher, 1996) that relates, in an M/G/1 queue, the expected queueing time
for a calling customer to the expected service time. An M/G/1 queue is a lower-bound
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approximation of an M/G/n queue (in other words, n servers in parallel can be
approximated as one server with a service rate bounded from above by the sum of the
service time of the individual servers. In the derivation of the profit function below, I
will approximate this compounded service time by a concave polynomial whose order c'
will be estimated). Specifically the Pollaczek-Khinchin formula implies:
AE[Z 2]
2(1 - AE[Z]) (6)
in which W is the time average waiting time and Z is customer service time. The
customer service time is a function of the number of service representatives and their
characteristics. The firm's valuation of the region's CSRs is denoted ,u,,. As explained
above, the relative importance of the regional characteristics Vi enter the model through
the marginal value of a CSR in different location, namely , which incorporates the
interactions between firm and region characteristics (the X 3fin Berry, 1994) and is
defined as:
yt = max(O, Pf V ) (Df ) (7)
where 3 is the marginal value of the regional characteristics Vi to firmf For instance,
firms could value regions differently based on whether or not they already have
operations in the region, or whether there is a good fit between the region's
characteristics and the production process of the firm. The term m(D) is a function of the
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firm characteristics Df that captures a form of vertical differentiation between firms in
the sense that firms with similar value for the benefits of the region might still differ in
their willingness to pay for this regional "quality."
Consider now what happens when a customer does not receive adequate service and its
revenue is lost. Suppose that (I-N) is the proportion of incoming calls that are not
answered (or that are given inadequate service). Then, the average revenue for the firm is
Rf= N*Af. Notice that N, the proportion of incoming calls that do not drop, corresponds
to the survival rate of the queueing system. Mandelbaum et al. (2000) study these
survival rates and show that they are exponentially decreasing functions of the average
waiting time. The waiting time can then be approximated as follows:
2
1
2t - `E[Z2] _ ( Xiapi
2(1-E[Z]) -A
AIn Xi"# aU
2 X, ) 1 [ Al n A]
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Then the survival rate is: e 2(YX'i') 2 and the associated expected revenue is
R = Xe 2(yX,~,)2 where A is (n X)/ X.
Firms choose the number of CSRs at different locations in order to maximize the profit
function in (5). This problem is a discrete (integer) problem and therefore cannot be
solved by standard optimization techniques. It is instructive though, and ultimately
useful for solving the maximization problem, to temporarily ignore the integer constraint
and derive the optimal number of agents in the relaxed problem. Without the integer
constraints, the profit function is maximized at the values for the CSRs that satisfy the
first-order conditions. Specifically:
The FOC of the profit function with respect to Xi are:
A
2e 2(yx,i)2 iX i ) piXj Pi= ° iIle A -•l -P, 0 Vi
which implies that:
XTi Pi PJ i (8)
This derivation yields two interesting insights. First, the relative number of agents
between different locations i andj is given by Equation (8) that shows how a firm's
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relative valuation of different regions can outweigh cost differentials (so that firms do not
necessarily locate in lower cost regions). Equation (8) also shows the factors that affect
the importance of non-pecuniary variables (as reflected in the 's) versus local unit costs
(the P's). Firms can prefer higher-cost regions for two reasons: the first reason is that the
firm's marginal value of some regional attribute is large and one region is well-endowed
in this attribute relative to another region. Alternatively, it may be the case that the value
differential between the two regions is small but that one firm's own characteristics (such
as high IT intensity) allows it to take advantage of this differential (which another firm is
unable to exploit). Firms whose marginal value of regional characteristics is the same but
whose own characteristics (as reflected in the term m(D)) differ may therefore have very
different localization strategies.
Second, the derivation of the optimal number of agents in the relaxed problem suggests
an approach for solving the integer problem. I can derive the optimal number of CSRs
without the integer constraint. For each firm, I select one region (without loss of
generality, I select the region i where the firm located the highest number of CSRs Xif)
and use (8) to compute the ratios of Xjf/Xf for the remaining regionsj. This provides an
analytical expression for each X as a function of Xif. I then use the first-order condition of
the profit function with respect to Xfto derive a closed-form solution for Xif, and
therefore for all the Xif. Using this non-integer solution, I search for the optimal vector of
integers by means of a standard branch-and-bound algorithm.
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For most firms, the procedure is fast enough for the limited number of regions in the
sample (see the sample description below) and discovers the optimal integer solution. In
the few cases where the optimal integer solution is not found after a number of search
iterations, the best integer solution in the branch-and-bound iterations is retrieved (in
practice, the variations in the optimal value around the various solutions are minuscule
and the error from the approximation is not significant). The outcome of this procedure
is a vector Xe of predicted CSR employment in every one of the different regions in the
choice set for a given set of random coefficients and parameters.
4.3 Summary
This chapter has derived an expression for the profit function from customer service at a
firm building on a stochastic specification of call arrivals and service time. The next
chapter will describe the data used in estimating the model and explain how the model
presented here and the data are pulled together in estimating the parameters. The results
will be discussed in Chapter 6.
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5 Data and Estimation
The data used in this research consist of two distinct data sets: One set contains
information about firms while the other contains information on region-specific economic
variables. The following describes each of these datasets.
5.1 Firm-Level Data
The firm-level data consist of a sample of Fortune 1000 firms in the manufacturing sector
(five different SIC 2-digit codes corresponding to industries such as machinery, computer
and electric/electronic equipment, food and chemicals). In choosing the industries, care
was given to select industries that offered relatively homogeneous customer-support
activities (all are manufacturing firms and offer sales and post-sales support of consumer
or industrial goods). In addition, the large scale of the firms guarantee that they would
produce for a national market and not be tied to local demand and supply factors. This is
important because it is difficult to obtain accurate measures of local supply and demand
(and by extension the amount of customer service required locally). I removed firms for
which data regarding the number of CSRs appeared to be missing or noisy. The total
number of Fortune 1000 firms in these four SIC codes is 104.
Table 1 below shows the five SIC codes that were chosen together with the number of
firms in the sample in each category. Appendix A lists the 104 companies in the sample.
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Table 1: Industries
The firm sample is constructed using data from Harte Hanks Market Intelligence CI
Technology database (hereafter CI database), a database compiled by Harte Hanks
Market Intelligence. Harte Hanks Market Intelligence is a commercial market research
firm that tracks use of Internet technology in business every year. I use the data collected
by Harte Hanks for the year 2000. The CI database contains firm-level data and
establishment-level data that include establishment characteristics, such as number of
employees, industry and location, use of technology hardware and software, such as
computers, networking equipment, printers and other office equipment; and use of
Internet applications and other networking services. Harte Hanks collects this
information to resell as a tool for the marketing divisions of technology companies.
Interview teams survey establishments throughout the calendar year. The sample that I
use contains the most current information as of December 2000.
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SIC 2-digit class SIC Description Corporations in Sample
20 Manufacturing: Food products 10
28 Manufacturing: Chemicals 26
35 Manufacturing: Machinery 35
36 Manufacturing: Electrical Equipment 20
38 Manufacturing: Instruments 13
In Table 2, I show a few features of the sample. The largest firm in the sample has
316,303 employees (IBM corporation) which is also the largest firm in terms of sales
with 88B dollars of revenue. Ninety eight percent of establishments are part of a multi-
establishment firm. The median firm in our sample has 142,690 employees.
Table 2: Sample statistics
For each firm, the data include the firm's annual sales (to control for scale) and its main
sector of activity (SIC 2-digit industry). Table 2 also shows the distribution of CSRs
across sites at the firms (a single firm has several sites across the US). The table presents
statistics of the total number of sites, for each firm, where the firm uses CSRs, the
proportion of "CSR sites" (establishments with at least one CSR) relative to the total
number of establishments at the firm, and the total number of CSRs at the firm.
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Variable Obs Mean Stdv Minimum Maximum
Number of 104 37.96 43.94 1.95 316.3
Employees (1000's)
Total Sales (in 104 9.7 13.14 1.23 88.4
billions)
Number of locations 104 3.2 3.7 1 12
with CSRs
Number of locations 104 0.32 0.51 0.09 0.76
with CSRs vs total
number of locations
Total Number of 104 129 352 16 2000
CSRs
In addition to data at the firm level, I also use data at the establishment level that allow
me to compute three additional firm-level metrics. The first metric is a measure of
diversification, namely the number of sectors (SIC 4-digit codes) in which a firm
operates. Customer service at firms that are more diversified may differ from customer
service at firms whose operations are more homogeneous. Diversification may restrict a
firm's ability to leverage call agents across product lines (or services) and increase the
importance of coordination between products or services. In such a case, we would
expect firms that are more diversified to be less sensitive to cost differences across
regions.
The second metric is the IT variable. The variable reflects both the intensity of Internet
usage at the firm and the variety of Internet usage. Variety is important as it captures
aspects of how IT is being used in an organization and not solely how much IT the
organization invested in. Organizations that tailor technological investments to their
organizational needs will be more likely to use a variety of technologies, adapted to the
particular circumstances in which different business activities take place. I calculated the
IT variable for each firm by aggregating the number of different types of Internet
applications used at the sites that employ CSRs. If n is the number of application types
used at site i, E, the number of employees at the site and X, is the number of applications
of type n used at the site, then the value of the IT variable is:
1 -1/2 X )2IT = - ((E)- (X,/)2 (9)(
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This metric captures both the intensity of Internet usage at the firm and the variety of
Internet usage. Therefore higher values of IT result either from a relatively higher usage
of IT at the site, or from a more diverse use of Internet applications. Internet applications
encompass what Harte-Hanks code as Internet server applications, Internet applications,
Internet/Web programming languages, Internet/Web servers, and Internet/Web software.
Examples of these applications are "ecommerce," "technical support," "web
development," "Java" and "Web server application."
The last variable is an organizational variable to assess the degree of decentralization at
the firm. The decision-rights measure is the proportion of sites for which IT (PCs, non-
PCs, and telecommunication) purchasing decisions are made locally (computer purchase
decisions are either made locally or at the parent/headquarters). For each site, each one
of these decisions is coded as 1 if the purchasing decision is decentralized and 0
otherwise. Aggregating across sites and decisions yields a measure of decentralization at
the firm.
Table 3 shows statistics for the three variables, Segments, IT, and Decentralization.
Variable Number of Mean Min Max
Observations
G: Segments 104 39.2 1 266
IT: IT variable 104 1.05 0.02 6.54
D:Decentralization 104 0.47 0.13 1
Table 3: Sample statistics for the establishment-level data
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5.2 Regional-Level Data
The choice set consists of 92 metropolitan statistical areas (or "regions") of the
continental U.S (none of the firms in the sample located customer service activities
outside these areas and therefore I ignored the remaining metropolitan statistical areas).
The definition of an MSA is that used by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. It incorporates a
major urban center and the county (or counties) that contains this city, along with any
adjacent counties that have at least 50 percent of their population in the urbanized area
surrounding the city. Each MSA is characterized by several variables: the monthly unit
costs of locating a CSR in the area, telecom infrastructure, density of the labor force in
the region, and a measure of proximity-based externalities. The establishment data
specify the MSA in which the establishment is located.
Monthly unit costs (UC) of hiring a CSR in a specific MSA include monthly wages,
obtained from the BLS data on occupations (occupation code 43-4051, "customer service
representatives"), and monthly commercial real estate rents in the area, obtained from the
Society of Industrial and Office Realtors. The space requirements for a CSR are drawn
from trade publications that recommend between 10 and 14 square meter per person. The
total unit costs from business rental expenditures are then calculated as ten times the
square meter rate in that region. The BLS data are at the metropolitan statistical area
level but the commercial real estate data is at a higher level of aggregation (so that a
single value of commercial real estate rents corresponds to several MSAs). This
introduces some noise in the cost data. However, rent expenditures are small in
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comparison to wage expenditures (about 6%) so that unaccounted-for variations in rents
will only bias the model if there is little variation in wages, which is not the case.
Figure 1 shows the distribution of wages over all MSAs. Note that there is considerable
variation in wages across the US. The minimum monthly wage for a CSR is $1337 and
the maximum is $3088.
Figure 1: CSR wage distribution across MSAs
The data on telecom infrastructure (TI) is intended to capture differences between
regions in telecommunication infrastructure. Intuitively, regions for which
telecommunication networks are sophisticated (and allow for faster speeds, higher
bandwidth and higher reliability) should be attractive to firms that rely on
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telecommunication for coordinating remote activities. The variable is computed using
data from the FCC publication Statistics of Communication Common Carriers
(2000/2001 Edition) that describe telecommunication facilities of incumbent carriers in
different states. I use the ratio of total fiber kilometers deployed (lit and dark) divided by
sheath kilometers of metallic cable. Such a measure cancels scale effects (the total
amount of cable - metallic or fiber - in one area is correlated with the density of the area)
and emphasizes the differences in technology between regions. The data from the FCC
are at the state level. Metropolitan-area estimates are generated by setting the MSA
estimate to the value of telecom infrastructure of the state to which the MSA belongs.
The third regional variable that I consider is a measure of the available labor pool in the
MSA (LP). A large labor pool can reduce the initial and subsequent costs of assembling
and maintaining a workforce for firms and therefore influence their location and hiring
decisions. It is possible that especially for larger firms such as those in the sample an
area with a large labor pool might be more attractive. As a proxy for the available labor
pool in the MSA I use the number of unemployed individuals in the MSA divided by
total unemployment across all MSA. The data are taken from the BLS 2000
Metropolitan Area Employment and Unemployment report.
The proximity variable is designed to capture differences between regions that arise from
localized spillovers. More specifically, firms may locate customer service functions
close to industrial (manufacturing) centers if they benefit from geographically localized
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spillovers. As explained above, these externalities arise from many sources including
knowledge spillovers. The variable LS captures the region's share of manufacturing in
the five industries under consideration. It is calculated as the regional share in the five
manufacturing industries in the sample (as a share of total manufacturing output of these
industries in the country).
Descriptive statistics for the regional variables can be found in Table 4.
Variable Observations Mean Std Dev Min Max
Unit Costs 92 2192 278 1337 3088
(UC)
Telecom 92 0.34 0.54 0.16 0.97
Infrastructure
(TI)
Percentage of 92 0.11 0.19 0.04 0.27
Available
Labor Pool
(LP)
Localized 92 0.08 0.09 0.02 0.18
Spillovers
(LS)
Table 4: Regional-level Variables
Although these four variables capture many of the regional factors that influence firms'
location and hiring decisions, there may be additional regional variables that are not
included and may be relevant. For instance, firms may consider the time zone of a
location when deciding where to site customer service functions: achieving customer
62
service that is geographically spread across different time zones may be a consideration
in deciding where to locate workers. Similarly, tax regimes can influence location
decisions. I control for any variable that influences location decisions at the state level by
including dummy variables S for the states in which firms locate. Therefore, although I
am not able to distinguish between state-level factors that influence location decision, the
dummy variables account for variations that arise from any state-level omitted variable.
I now combine the model described in chapter 4 and the data presented in this chapter in
order to estimate the parameters of the model. The estimation is based on the method of
moments in which the integral in (2) is simulated.
5.3 Estimation
The model described above predicts the number of agents Xf (Df, f , 0) at each
location for a firmf as a function of observed firm characteristics D, random coefficients
f, and the vector of parameters to be estimated 0. In other words, given fi and 0 the
number of agents is a deterministic function of the firm characteristics.
Let Xf (D , 0) = (X,..., XJ) be the vector of CSRs at firmf and locations ...j.
Since the coefficients f are distributed with density h(Pl 0) where 0 refers collectively to
the parameters of this distribution (such as the means and the covariance matrix of ) the
expectation of Xf (D1 , f, 0), X1 (in which the superscript e on X to denote
expectation is simply a more convenient notation than the typical expectation operator E)
is given by:
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X(DD,) = Df , Pf ,O)h(dpf I Dj,O) (10)
where h is the density of the random parameters Pfconditional on the information D.
Unfortunately, it is impossible to solve this integral analytically or even numerically as
both the regions of integration that generate the different choices and the dimensionality
of the integral preclude any kind of closed-form expression for this integral.
Nevertheless, it can be approximated through simulation for any given value of the
parameters. The procedure is as follows:
(1) Draw a value of from h(PI 0) and label it with the superscript r=l referring to
the first draw
(2) Calculate the optimal vector of CSRs, Xf (D , r, 0) with this draw
(3) Repeat steps (1) and (2) R times, averaging the results. This average is the
simulated optimal vector of CSRs:
Xk =RY Xr=lX (Df, f0)
Xf is an unbiased estimator of Xf by construction. Its variance decreases as R increases.
The simulated vector of CSRs is used to estimate the parameters of the model (including
the parameters of the distributions) via the method of simulated moments as follows.
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Given the predicted staff assignments Xe (Df , 0) and the observed number of agents Xf
at the different locations for firm f let us define the prediction error E. (Df, 0) as:
f (Df,0) = Xf - X (Df,O) (8)
At the true parameter 00, the moment of the prediction error is identically zero:
E(Ef I Df,0 0)= forf = 1,...,F
Any function g(Df) of the conditioning variables must also be uncorrelated with this
A
error. As a result, the value of 0, say 0, that sets the sample analog of this moment
1 FGF(O) = - I g(Df)®ej(DO,O)F (10)
equal to zero or as close as possible to zero is a consistent estimator of 00. Under
A
appropriate regularity conditions, asymptotic normality of 0 is ensured (see Hansen,
1982). If the number of moment conditions is larger than the number of parameters to be
estimated (the model is over-identified), an efficient estimator is found by combining the
moment conditions through a weighing matrix V. The efficient weighing matrix as
suggested by Hansen (1982) is
V = E((g(D)E)(g(D)e)') (11)
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(9)
A0 is then asymptotically normally distributed with mean 00 and asymptotic variance-
covariance matrix
aG(0o) V-1 aG(0 0) (12)
Unfortunately, the function X~ (Df, 0) is not known analytically. Unlike classic discrete-
choice models in which latent variables are simple linear functions of characteristics and
error terms are assumed to have a specific structure (independent across observations
with the extreme value distribution e.g., in the logit specification), the profit function
above is highly non-linear and the integrals are not easily computable. When analytic
expressions are not available, it is possible to obtain simulation-based estimates of the
distributions as suggested by McFadden (1989) and Pakes and Pollard (1989). The
straightforward way of simulating the expectation X~ (Df, 0) is by averaging the
underlying random function over a set of random draws. The resulting estimator
of X (D , 0) is trivially an unbiased estimator of the true expectation X (D, 0).
McFadden (1989) and Pakes and Pollard (1989) prove that the MSM estimator that sets
the simulated moment as close as possible to zero is typically consistent for finite number
of simulation draws (the intuition is that the simulation error averages out over
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observations as N - oo ). To conduct the simulation, it is therefore enough to draw
F x S x K normals where K is the number of random coefficients per firm. The resulting
values represent: the random components off s preferences.
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6 Results
The estimation of the model is based on the method of simulated moments. The first step
is to compute the predicted staff assignments across regions from the model of firm
behavior by maximizing the profit function above. Given a set of values for the various
parameters in the model, the optimal location and hiring choices are established. This in
turn determines the value of the function G. The process is then iterated for different
values of the parameters. In order to estimate the parameters, we need to make
assumptions on the functional form and distribution of the random coefficients. The
random coefficients are assumed to be normally distributed with mean and variance to be
estimated. Fixed effects are introduced to capture regional factors that affect firms'
location choices. I include state dummy variables to capture unobserved factors that vary
at the state level. Including dummy variables is also useful in reducing the potential
endogeneity biases of the kind studied by Berry (1994) in which prices (unit costs) are
correlated with unobserved characteristics (the unobserved quality). By using state
dummies and assuming that any endogeneity is at the state level, one does not need the
inversion procedure that Berry describes. Dummies affect the mean utility level of the
state, but have no effect on the substitution patterns between metropolitan areas (these are
driven by the variations in the observed characteristics in each metropolitan area). I use
random coefficients on each of the state dummies.
In order to estimate the model, I need to specify functional forms for the various
components of the model: the arrival rates, the differentiation coefficient and the regional
valuation. The arrival rates vary across firms based on various firm-specific parameters.
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In the first specification (model A), the parameter X is simply a function of IT and CSR
(the average number of CSRs in the industry in which firmfoperates). The dependence
on IT reflects the possibility that offering web-based customer support reduces the
number of calls to the firm. The arrival rate at firm fin model A is therefore:
= (fof*T + f 2* CSR)* 
The second specification (model B) enriches the functional form of X by incorporating
the diversification variable (G) as well as a dummy variable ND that takes value 1 if the
firm's primary industry is an industry that produces non-durable goods.
B = (f +f * IT +f 2*CSR + f 3 *Gf+ f 4 *ND)*S
The vertical differentiation coefficient, m(Df), is assumed to be a linear function of two
characteristics of the firm, namely IT and decentralization as follows (the intercept is
normalized to 1):
m(Df)=l+mlIT+m 2 D (13)
This functional form allows firms to differ in their relative preferences (between cost and
other regional benefits) based on the intensity of their IT investments and the degree of
decentralization at the firm. Finally, the characteristics of the region i enter the marginal
utility of service as follows:
Mit = ac + P,iLF + ,2TI + P3LS + ySj
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where Si is a state dummy variable for regionj.
The estimation was performed in Matlab. I increased the number of draws from three
(for the first estimation passes) to ten (R=10) in order to increase efficiency (see
McFadden, 1989). I computed the predicted vector of CSRs (the vector has ninety two
elements, one per region) as explained above in the estimation section. Following
McFadden (1989) and Pakes and Pollard (1989), I held the draws constant over different
function evaluations (to avoid infinite jumpiness) and used different simulation draws for
different observations to make the simulation error average out faster. The instruments
that I used were a constant, the number of sectors a firm operates in and the
decentralization variable at the firm. The profit function in (5) is non-differentiable for
any finite number of simulation draws. Therefore, I used the Nelder-Meade non-
derivative "simplex" search algorithm to minimize the function (Hendel, 1999). To ease
the search, I broke the problem into two sub-problems, estimating the dummy
coefficients and then the other parameters, before estimating the whole coefficient vector.
Estimates of the parameters can be found in Table 6 (parameters that are significant are in
bold)
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fo
(intersect of arrival rate
equation)
fi
(IT in arrival rate)
f2
(Avg number of CSRs in
industry in arrival rate)
f3
(Industry segments in arrival
rate)
f4
(Non-Durable Dummy)
ml
(IT in differentiation coefficient)
m2
(Decentralization variable in
differentiation coefficient)
Var(y)
(variance of random coeff)
p i
(Labor Pool in the Region)
/32
(Telecom Infrastructure)
P3
(Proximity Variable)
0.297* 10-'
(0.311 * 10-3)
-0.0019*10 -3
(0.0007* 10-3 )
0.044*10-3
(0.013*10 -3)
-0.0068
(0.0018)
-0.094
(0.187)
10.9
(2.81)
0.31
(0.184)
-0.056
(0.197)
0.279
(0.114)
-0.0026* 10-3
(0.0011 * 10-3)
0.092* 10 - 3
(0.047*10 -3)
-0.136*10-5
(0.075* 10-5)
0.22* 10-3
(1.04* 10-3)
-0.0081
(0.0029)
-0.021
(0.0106)
9.2
(3.5)
0.27
(0.12)
-0.182
(0.333)
0.314
(0.148)
Table 6 Parameter Estimates. Bold font indicates statistically significant parameters at the 5%
confidence level
The significantfi, in both models, captures the relationship between Internet applications
at the firm and the call volume at the firm. The sign of the coefficient is negative,
pointing to a negative relationship between the average number of calls at the locations
we observe and the use of Internet applications by the firm. As mentioned above, this
could be the result of fewer callers (customers of firms with extensive Internet presence
substitute Web-based service to call agents), or to the outsourcing of customer service to
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locations that we do not observe such as, for instance, overseas. The magnitude of the
coefficient shows that there is a small impact of Internet business applications on these
practices, even though the data cannot distinguish between the two effects.
The coefficientsf which measures the impact of the average number of CSR in each
industry on the call volume at the firm is significant at the 5% level and as expected,
positive in both models. The two coefficients on diversification and non-durables in
model B are not significant.
To evaluate the magnitude of the Internet effect on CSR employment, I use the first-order
conditions above to find the elasticity of X with respect to the use of Internet applications.
To keep things simple, I assume that the value of m(Df) stays constant (i.e., there is a
compensating change in the decision- rights variable with the change in the IT variable so
that m(Df) remains constant). Given this assumption, the elasticity of X with respect to
the use of Internet applications, at the sample means, has a value of -0.13. That is, a 10%
increase in the index of Internet application use is associated with a 1.3% decrease in the
national employment of CSRs. Alternatively, a doubling of the index of Internet
application decreases employment by 13%.
The coefficients ml and m2 are significant in model B although m2, the coefficient on
decentralization is not significant in model A. When significant, they support the
hypothesis that Internet usage and decision rights affect location choice patterns. The
coefficients are negative, suggesting that firms with higher Internet usage, or more
dispersed decision rights, are less sensitive to quality differences between regions and
more cost-sensitive. In other words, Internet-based applications and distributed decision
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rights reduce the vertical differentiation with respect to non-pecuniary regional benefits
between firms. To get a sense of the magnitude of these effects, I calculated the change
in average costs from a change in m(Df). Given a valuation ratio ki (between a region i
and a reference regionj), the elasticity of relative regional employment (between i andj)
with respect to ml is Ei= ml *ln ki*IT. The change in total costs TC'/TC is then:
TC' EikiPiTC_~ ~ (14)
TC kiPs
Evaluated at the regional dummy coefficients (the mean utility of the different regions)
and sample mean of IT, the change in total costs is equal to -0.098 (using the estimated
value of model B). Thus, a 10% increase in the number of Internet applications (per
sales) is associated with savings of about 1% from the unit costs of CSRs. The intuition
behind this result is that firms take advantage of lower unit costs by locating their staff in
regions that would not have been attractive without IT, presumably because of
coordination and informational costs. The same technique gives an estimate of the
impact of a change in decision rights allocation between subsidiaries and headquarters
(replace ml by m2 and IT by D in e). The resulting value is -0.02, which implies that
increasing the number of sites to which purchasing decision rights are delegated (or the
number of decisions delegated to a branch) by 10% results in a 0.2% reduction in unit
costs from relocation. In other words, firms that are more decentralized are more likely
to take advantage of cost arbitrage between regions and save on unit costs. An interesting
result concerns the coefficient Var(y): it is significantly different from zero, indicating
heterogeneity in tastes among firms between regions. This result validates the use of
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random coefficients for regional dummies, and shows that idiosyncratic differences
among firms have a significant impact on valuation of regions, and ultimately, location
decisions.
The individual effect of regional characteristics on valuation is reflected in the
coefficients . The coefficient on TI (telecom infrastructure) is of the wrong sign, with
large standard error. This might be a result of poor data, the FCC data being an
aggregated index that covers the infrastructure of residential, rural, and business
telecommunication lines and is perhaps not sufficiently correlated with the portfolio and
price of telecom services offered to businesses. Also, since local residential markets have
not become as competitive as business and long-distance markets, the index might not
reflect true telecom costs for businesses. Finally there has been over-investment in fiber
optic lines at the end of the century such that the telecommunication infrastructure
differences between regions have become less critical to firms (since all regions offered
similar technological capabilities). But it could also be that regional telecom
infrastructure is not a significant factor influencing firms' location decisions. Both of the
variables that capture externalities due to proximity (to other firms or to the firm's own
activities) are however highly significant. This shows that firms value proximity to their
own activities and proximity to other firms or to customers. Finally, the density of the
labor force (LF) has the expected sign and is significant at the 10% confidence level in
one model specification but not in the other. It suggests that firms may value proximity
to regions where the labor pool is large. The R2 of this regression is 0.17, suggesting that
random valuation accounts for most of the variation in regional preferences.
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6.1 Discussion
The results above suggest that IT has an impact on a firm's ability to de-locate activities
and reduces its dependence on location-related characteristics. Specifically, I found that:
1. As a firm uses more IT, its ability to exploit cost differentials increases. In other
words, lower-cost locations are more attractive to IT-intensive firms. This translates
into cost savings of about 1% of total unit costs for every 10% increase in IT.
2. The elasticity of CSR employment to the use of IT is -0.13. There are two possible
explanations for this finding. First, technology may substitute for domestic
representatives. UPS for instance delivers packages and documents throughout the
United States and in over 200 other countries and territories. It has installed
information systems that allow customers to track their packages through the Internet.
In 2003, UPS delivered an average of more than 13 million pieces per day worldwide.
Assuming that only 1% of these packages were tracked by customers (a conservative
assumption), 130,000 calls to customer service representatives are saved by using the
Internet. Clearly, the Internet substitutes for CSRs in this case. It is also possible that
technology makes employees more efficient. Verizon for instance uses an Internet-
based customer support system that allows a customer to "chat" online with a
representative by opening a window called a "ticket." This allows CSRs to be more
efficient by enabling them to deal with several customers at the same time. Both of
these reasons could explain the substitution effect found in the data.
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3. Mean regional preferences vary significantly between firms, even after accounting for
characteristics of the area. This suggests that the idiosyncratic factors that enter
firms' location decisions are non-negligible. Still regional characteristics help
explain preferences: location externalities (the benefits of proximity to customers,
other firms or other activities at the same firm) explain part of the firm-specific
regional preferences. Region-specific characteristics however, such as labor markets
and telecom infrastructure cannot be shown to influence location decisions based on
this dataset.
4. I also found that sensitivity to location characteristics is lower the more decentralized
the firm is. Presumably, firms whose decision loci are decentralized may be able to
take advantage of regional cost differentials by delegating authority to the division
managers. The next chapter will consider a model of delegation of decision rights
from headquarters to divisions and the implications for investment in compatibility.
It must be noted though that the finding does not imply any causality: in fact, it is
quite possible that firms who delegate decision rights are those whose dependency on
locational externalities is weak in the first place, which then explains why they are
also more likely to benefit from the substitution between IT and these location
benefits.
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6.2 Assumptions, Limitations and Possible Biases
The IT construct incorporates variety in use of IT. As such, this construct may capture
spurious correlation with other sources of variety at the firm (e.g., product
diversification). In order to control for variety, I used the "industry segments" variable G
in the specification of m(Df) as followed:
m(Dj) = mlIT + m2 Rf +m3G
The results are reported in Table 7. The estimated parameters do not change significantly
from the inclusion of the "industry segments" variable. The coefficient on this variable
itself' is not statistically significant and of the wrong sign.
Another potential source of bias arises from the fact that the data are collected by Harte-
Hanks through a survey of firms. This can potentially introduce a bias if the firms that
reported data on their CSRs are systematically more likely to be IT-intensive. In order to
test whether the sample of firms reporting data for CSR employment was significantly
different from those that did not report, I performed a t-test of the means of IT between
the two samples. The t-test rejected the hypothesis of different means, so that sampling
bias did not appear to be an issue in the sample.
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fo
(intersect of arrival rate
eauation)
fi
(IT in arrival rate)
f2
(Avg number of CSRs in
industry in arrival rate)
f3
(Industry segments in arrival
rate)
f4
(Non-Durable Dummy)
ml
(IT in differentiation coefficient)
m2
(Decentralization variable in
differentiation coefficient)
m3
(Industry segments in
differentiation coefficient)
Var(y)
(variance of random coeff)
/3i
(Labor Pool in the Region)
/32
(Telecom Infrastructure)
P 3
(Proximity Variable)
0.234* 10- 
(0.306*10-3 )
-0.0037* 10 -3
(0.0009*10- 3)
0.061*10-3
(0.014*10- 3)
-0.0066
(0.0014)
-0.075
(0.136)
0.0008
(1.23)
8.32
(1.99)
0.37
(0.184)
-0.011
(0.612)
0.67
(0.21)
-0.0041 *10-
(0.0019*10-3)
0.087*10-3
(0.0417*10-3 )
-0.111*10 '5
(0.082* 10- 5)
0.234*10-'3
(0.49* 10-3 )
-0.0081
(0.0026)
-0.015
(0.011)
0.016
(0.98)
9.1
(3.9)
0.41
(0.15)
-0.61
(0.934)
0.84
(0.33)
Table 7 Parameter Estimates. Bold font indicates statistically significant parameters at the 5%
confidence level
The MSM estimators reported here are consistent if the instruments are uncorrelated with
the model residuals. Ultimately, whether the instruments are really uncorrelated with the
residuals is an open question. There is however no a priori reason to suspect any
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0.524 10--'
(0.61 1 *103)
correlations between them. Notice also that the estimators are unbiased even for a fixed
number of draws as the simulated distribution enters the moment equation linearly.
Although MSM estimators are less efficient than MSL (maximum likelihood) estimators,
the unbiasedness of the MSM estimators makes MSL estimators would be biased as the
simulated distribution is a non-linear function in the likelihood function.
6.3 Sensitivity of the Results to the Specification of the IT
Variable
The IT construct used in this study is non-traditional. As explained above, the rationale
for using equation (9) above to define the IT intensity at the firm is that it provides a
better measure of how IT is actually used at the firm than traditional accounting measures
such as IT budget. In addition, there are no readily available financial data of IT
investment at the site level so that any metric of IT would have to use aggregate
accounting measures such as total IT budget at the firm level. However, one may wonder
whether the calibration of the IT metric in (9) to account for the diversity in IT
investment by the firm is driving the results. In order to test the sensitivity of the results
to the specification of the IT variable, I estimated the model parameters of a modified
model A for which the IT construct is defined as:
IT = a E n (Xn )
This specification simply defines IT as the number of Internet applications per employee,
without accounting for the diversity in these applications. The results appear in Table 8.
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fo
(intersect of arrival rate
eauation)
fi
(IT in arrival rate)
f2
(Avg number of CSRs in
industry in arrival rate)
ml
(IT in differentiation coefficient)
m2
(Decentralization variable in
differentiation coefficient)
Var(y)
(variance of random coef
(Labor Pool in the Region)
/32
(Telecom Infrastructure)
P3
(Proximity Variable)
0.297*10 0-
(0.311 * 10-3)
-0.0018*10 -3
(0.001 * 10-3)
0.045*10-3
(0.022*103)
-0.0074
(0.003)
-0.124
(0.187)
12.9
(4.41)
0.15
(0.094)
-0.036
(0.097)
0.152
(0.065)
Table 8 Parameter Estimates. Bold font indicates statistically significant parameters at the 5%
confidence level
The results do not show any significant qualitative change in any of the parameter
estimates. The main consequence of changing the IT construct is to increase the standard
deviations of the parameter estimates. Also, the estimate for the parameter on the labor
force LF becomes statistically insignificant. The conclusion from these results is that
including diversity in the IT construct does not capture the differences in IT investment
between firms (which are reflected in the total IT applications per employee already) but
increases the efficiency of the parameters.
80
'1
6.4 Managerial Implications
This research suggests several ways for managers to approach the location decisions that
are quickly becoming crucial to business operations in an interconnected world.
Managers need to understand the right balance between short-term benefits (cost savings)
and long-term capabilities. This will entail deciding what functions should stay and what
functions can be de-located. The important conclusion of this research is that there exist
some location benefits that are responsible for some of the firm's productivity, and that
some of these benefits may not be apparent to managers. The productivity advantage that
arises from location should be carefully weighed against the potential cost savings from
de-location, and care must be taken to replicate the sources of these productivity
advantages, if possible, in the new location. Viewed this way, off-shoring bears some
similarity to a surgical operation: delicate geographical connections between activities
must be preserved if the firm does not want to lose a source of its productivity advantage
and IT cannot always replace every one of these interconnections.
6.5 Future Research
Future research will address other industries, and other functions (such as programming
for instance). It is possible that the importance of location and the degree of
substitutability between IT and location benefits depends on the type of task that is being
performed. Future research in that area would shed light on this question. It will also be
interesting to look at the performance of the firms that de-locate activities. I have
recently undertaken such an analysis. Longer-term, we need to understand what is
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happening inside firms that makes de-locating activities easier or, on the contrary,
impossible.
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7 IT and Decentralization
Widespread investments in information technologies have allowed firms to coordinate
activities inside the firm by sharing databases, exchanging documents, combining
products and in general simply communicating directly across the enterprise. A central
requirement of the collaborative process between organizational actors of the firm is for
the technology and the assumptions embedded in that technology to be compatible among
the interacting agents. While compatibility and standards have had important
implications for the suppliers of technology (including decisions on whether to make a
product compatible with those of rivals, thereby competing within a standard, or make
them incompatible and then competing between standards) the requirement for
compatibility across different organizational units within the firm has implications about
the structure of the firm. Since the productivity of many information technologies (in
particular communication technologies) rely on network effects in which the marginal
productivity of the adoption of a technology by one part of the firm is higher if the rest of
the firm adopts this technology as well, firms have an incentive to require coordinated
investments in technology across the enterprise. Disparate systems entail higher
maintenance costs and result in costly communication when different units must
collaborate on a given product. Still, research in IS has also highlighted the fact that
productivity of computer investments is highly dependent on co-investment in
complementary assets (for instance, human capital and work processes). In fact, the last
chapter of this thesis reports on a survey of enterprise-wide large IT projects in a sample
of firms that demonstrates that hardware investments account for less than a third of the
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total costs of implementation of large-scale software projects. Many of these additional
investments are intangible and highly dependent on the local expertise and the knowledge
of the branch or division. In order to generate the best fit between the computer
investments and the intangibles, firms choose the parameters of their organizational
structure, and in particular the allocation of decision rights, such that the need for
compatibility across divisions is balanced with the productivity benefits of accessing
local expertise. The necessity to keep computer investments compatible across divisions
introduces coordination costs and encourages firms to centralize investment decisions in
technologies with strong network effects at the headquarter level so that investments are
compatible across divisions. However, when local knowledge is very important, the
uninformed headquarters have an incentive to delegate decision rights to the local branch
(Jensen and Meckling, 1992). This tradeoff between local knowledge and coordination
explains the patterns of decision rights allocation within the firm.
7.1 Literature Review
Standardization and compatibility have long been studied for their impact on the strategic
choice of product manufacturers in the computer, telecommunications and consumer
electronics industries. New product innovations have the potential to level the field
between incumbents and new entrants (Brynjolfsson and Kemerer 1996) by reducing the
lock-in that arises from the existing technological base. Compatibility increases
consumer welfare in many markets: compatible ATMs increase the availability of bank
point-of-contacts (Saloner and Shepard, 1995) for instance and is evident in many
markets ranging from game consoles to stereo systems. Compatibility is not limited to
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technological product markets. Puffert (1991) discusses compatibility in the context of
railway gauge standardization in the southern US during the mid-nineteenth century.
Before standardization, at every break of a gauge (the border between two regions) goods
had to be transshipped from one piece of the network to the other resulting in significant
costs. This problem led to the conversion of more than 20,000 miles of track in North
America alone. Information technologies and the development of the Internet have
contributed in moving the standardization and compatibility issues to the frontline as
researchers attempted to understand how the economics of network effects can explain
the emergence and persistence of dominant players in markets such as operating systems
(Microsoft), servers (IBM) and microprocessors (Intel).
The bulk of the research in the area of standardization attempts to explain demand-side
scale economies that arise from compatibility in the form of increasing returns to
adoption, in which the value a consumer derives from purchasing a good increases with
its scope of diffusion. Economides and Flyer (1998) examine two different regimes of
intellectual property rights: non proprietary (firms can freely coalesce) versus proprietary
standards (each firm has its own technical standard and a consensus is necessary).
Equilibria of the two-stage game are often asymmetric in production levels, prices,
output, a tendency which increases with the intensity of network externalities. This
stream of research is mainly concerned with the industrial organization implications of
network effects: they can act as a multiplier on firms' incentives to undercut their rivals
(De Palma and Leruth, 1993). The benefits of compatibility can also be indirect:
Cusumano et al. (1992) argue that the availability of complementary products
(prerecorded tapes) drove VHS to dominate over Betamax in the early 1980s though both
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technologies were of similar quality. Cottrell and Koput (1998) estimate the effect of
software provision on the valuation of hardware in the early microcomputer industry and
find a positive relationship between software availability and platform price: variety
serves as a signal for platform quality. In Farrell and Saloner (1986) standardization is a
constraint on product variety. When consumers have different preferences in their ideal
specifications for the good, standardization drives some consumers to purchase their less
preferred version of the good in order to attain a larger network benefit; this in turn might
yield too little variety compared to the social optimum.
Much of the literature on compatibility considers therefore the question from a market-
level point of view: pricing, competition, product choice and market power. There is
little research on how compatibility influences the industrial organization of the firm
itself, and the empirical research is even scarcer. Greenstein (1993) studies mainframe
procurement decisions in government agencies and shows that compatibility with
installed base is a major factor affecting purchase decisions. Much of the research on
compatibility inside the firm focuses on the importance of switching costs in investment
decisions: Breuhan (1997) examines the role of switching costs on firm software
purchase decisions and finds switching costs of migrating from Wordperfect to Microsoft
Word. Forman and Chen (2004) study the impact of switching costs on vendor choice in
the market for routers and switches. While informative with respect to the importance of
compatibility in driving investment decisions inside the firm, these studies do not
consider the broader issue of how compatibility requirements affect both investment
decisions and the internal organization of the firm, in particular its allocation of decision
rights.
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In this research I propose to study the tradeoff within firms between the need for
compatibility and the need to access local knowledge at the sites. I present a model that
captures the following two forces pulling in opposite directions: on the one hand,
headquarters would like division managers to use their knowledge of the inside workings
of their divisions to derive maximum productivity benefits from technology investments.
This is because headquarters do not know which investments are most appropriate for the
division. On the other hand, managers and headquarters' goals are not completely
aligned: headquarters are interested in minimizing incompatible technologies so that
coordination across units will be more efficient whereas division managers prefer to
maximize the profits of their own divisions even at the expense of the rest of the
organization. The next section describes the model in more detail.
7.2 The Model
Consider a model of a firm with two divisions di and dj, both of which are risk-neutral.
Both parties must decide on the nature and magnitude of some investment in technology.
For technology to be compatible across the two units, di and dj must choose similar
technologies. Technological choices by di and dj are fully compatible if both divisions
choose the same technology, and the farther away the choice of each division, the less
compatible the technologies are. To simplify the model, we assume that party dj has only
one use for the technology (inside the relationship with di) while party di uses the
investment both inside its relationship with dj and for some other productive activity
specific to di. This implies that whereas compatibility is critical to dj, di has another use
for the technology (a private use) that does not require compatibility with dj. di must
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therefore weigh the tradeoffs between the benefits it derives from using the technology in
its private use versus in the relationship with dj. Technology usage is non-rival (so that
di using the technology in the relationship with dj does not preclude the use of the
technology for her private needs).
Both di and dj belong to the same firm with headquarters H. Headquarters decide
whether to grant purchasing decision rights to each of the divisions di and dj. If the two
divisions choose technologies that are not fully compatible, there is a cost to the company
proportional to how incompatible the choices are, with marginal costs rising with the
degree of incompatibility. When decision rights are centralized at headquarters,
headquarters decide which technology is implemented at each division. Headquarters can
also decide to transfer decision rights to one or both divisions. Transferring decision
rights to a division d means that d has the right to choose its technology. A division that
has the right to choose its technology also bears the full costs of coordination in the event
technological choices at the two divisions are not compatible, provided that the other unit
did not have the right to choose its technology as well. If decision rights are delegated to
both divisions, coordination costs are split evenly between the two units (symmetric
splitting of coordination costs also happens if rights are centralized at headquarters).
The degree of interconnection between the two units (a measure of how dependent they
are on each other) is denoted by X. This represents how much of the total output of
division di is dependent on dj. X is assumed to be exogenous and is determined prior to
any interaction between the two divisions.
The choice of technology by a division dk consists in choosing a variable ak, k E , j}. In
order to achieve perfect compatibility between the two divisions, ai should be set equal to
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aj. The choice of ai however influences how well the technology is adapted to the local
environment of di. The local information that enables di to adapt the technology for her
private use is a random variable Oi, 0 < 0 < 1, with mean 0, and variance ar2 . The
realized value of Oi is observable by di only. In order to achieve the best fit between the
technology and the local environment, di should set ai equal to Oi.
We are now in a position to specify the production function of the organization as a
function of ai, aj, X and Oi:
F(ai, aj,i)= - (ai - ajy )+ (1 - X - (ai - OiY) (1)
The first term in F reflects the need for compatibility between the divisions, while the
second term corresponds to di's individual contribution that is independent of dj. To
keep things simple, the specification of F implies that only di faces a tradeoff between
local fit and global compatibility. Dj's sole concern is to achieve compatibility with di's
technological choice. While restrictive, this specification allows me to focus on the
tradeoff between local fit and compatibility within one division, without the
complications that arise when both divisions face this tradeoff independently. Notice that
the maximum output achievable is normalized to 1, and that lack of compatibility
(respectively lack of fit) subtracts from the output in proportion to the relative importance
of compatibility and fit in the production process. For instance, if di has very little
interaction with dj, X will be low and achieving better fit with local circumstances more
crucial than achieving compatibility.
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7.3 Optimal Choices under Different Delegation Regimes
I now determine the optimal investment choice by the two divisions under different rights
regime. There are four different situations:
1. Technology choice is centralized at headquarters for both decisions (this is the
"central planner" outcome).
2. The right to choose the technology is delegated to division di but is centralized for
division dj.
3. The right to choose the technology is delegated to division dj but is centralized for
division di.
4. Both divisions are delegated the right to choose the technology.
As will be seen below, in this simple model what matters is whether di has decision rights
or not. To show this, I consider each of these situations in turn.
7.3.1 Full Centralization
In this case, headquarters maximize (1) by choosing both ai and aj.
(ai,aj) =argmax{z(1 - (ai- aj)2) + (1- )(1- (ai- j)2)}
ai,aj
The first-order conditions yield:
E(-2x(ai - aj) - 2(1 - X)(ai - Oi)) = 0
E(2x(ai - aj)) = O
which implies that ai = aj = i
Under full centralization, the choice of technology by headquarters for both divisions is
based solely on compatibility concerns. Given the lack of knowledge regarding the local
90
circumstances 0i, headquarters' best strategy is to focus on maximizing compatibility
between the two divisions. This is consistent with what we would expect since the
comparative advantage of centralization is in headquarters' ability to impose a common
environment across the enterprise.
7.3.2 Partial Decentralization: the Case of dj
In this case, decision rights are delegated to dj but remain centralized for di. Since only
one division has decision rights delegated to her, dj bears the full costs of coordination.
The division of output is therefore:
O(dj) = X(1 - (ai -aj) 2 )
O(di) = (1- x)(1- (ai- i) 2)
Division dj maximizes output by choosing aj, while headquarters maximize output by
choosing ai.
The first-order conditions are:
E(-2(1 - X)(ai - i)) = 0
E(2X(ai - aj)) = 0
which imply that ai = aj = Oi as well. In this case, since it is optimal for dj, who has the
decision rights, to set her technological investment in order to maximize compatibility,
she will have an incentive to emulate the choice of technology of di. But di does not
have the decision rights, and therefore her choice of technology is determined by the
uninformed headquarters. The optimal setting in that case is for headquarters to set
technology at di to be the expected value of her local information and for dj to copy this
choice as well.
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Notice that in this setting, headquarters are indifferent between delegating decision rights
to dj or keeping them all centralized. Indeed, delegating decision rights to dj (but not to
di) in a model where dj cares only about compatibility is equivalent to keeping the
decision rights centralized. This is not the case however when decision rights are
delegated to di as the following shows.
7.3.3 Partial Decentralization: the Case of di
In this case, decision rights are delegated to di but remain centralized for dj. As in the
case above, since only one division has decision rights delegated to her, di bears the full
costs of coordination. The division of output is therefore:
O(di) = (l - (ai - aj)) + (1- )(1 - (ai- )2)
O(dj) = K
where K is some fixed payment (transfer) from di to dj (which can be zero).
In this case, the marginal product for dj is fixed for any investment aj. Let us assume that
headquarters chooses aj = Gi, a reasonable assumption since Oi is the most salient value
of investment in this problem (similar to "sunspot" refinements of Nash equilibria in the
presence of multiple equilibria). Although the qualitative results are not affected by the
choice of dj, the analysis is simplified if a particular equilibrium is picked among the
possible equilibria.
The interesting side of this situation is in di's choice of a technology. The first-order
condition for di given dj's choice is:
-2X(ai - aj) - 2(1- )(ai - Oi) = 0
= ai = XOi + (1- X)i
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Therefore, di's choice of a technology reflects the tradeoff between compatibility and
local knowledge. di's incentive to choose a technology that will be compatible with the
choice that headquarters impose on dj is weighed by her desire to fit the technology to her
local circumstances so that she can derive productivity benefits from the better fit. The
relative weight that di assigns to each of these concerns depends on the relative
importance of dj's inputs in di's production process. If the share of the inputs that dj
contributes to di is small, there is a larger incentive for di to neglect compatibility and
emphasize local fit.
The last case corresponds to the situation where headquarters delegate decision rights to
both firms.
7.3.4 Full Decentralization
In this case, decision rights are delegated to both firms, and both share the costs of
incompatibility. The utility function of each division is then:
O(dj) = x(1- 2 (ai - a
O(di) = x- (ai - a )+ ( - X - (ai - i)
Each division maximizes its output function independently of the other's choice of
technology. The first-order conditions are:
FOCj: E(y(ai- aj))= =0 aj = E(ai)
FOCi: X(ai - aj)+ 2(1 - Xai -Oi) = 0
Xai - xaj + 2ai - 2Xai - 20i + 2XOi = 0
ai(2 - ) = xai + 20i - 20Oi
i aj + 20i(1 - X)
2-X
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Plugging in the value for aj, we get
E(ai)= E XE(ai) + 20i(1- X) 
= (2 - X)E(ai) = 2E(ai) + 2(1 - x)Oi
= E(ai) = Oi
which in turn determines ai:
ai i + 2i(- X)
2-x
The first observation is that in this case, the optimal choice of technology for dj is also
ai = Oi as in the previous cases, although the rationale is different. Whereas in previous
cases compatibility was achieved by choosing aj = Oi since headquarters were
responsible for choosing ai (and headquarters not being more informed than dj herself
about Oi would require di to take action i ), one could think that in the case of full
decentralization, the best response on the side of dj should take into account the fact that
di is now free to choose her technology. But the derivation above shows that the
expectation of the choice of di is Oi so that there is little reason for dj to choose another
value: dj's "best bet" is still to choose the expected value of di's local information.
The second observation is that di's best response is again a weighted average of her
desire to achieve compatibility with dj and to obtain the best fit between her
technological investment and the local conditions. However, the weights on each
component differ from the case of partial decentralization above. Here, di puts
X on the compatibility component of her investment decision and 2- 2X on the fit
(2 - X) (2 - X)
with her local knowledge.
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The following graph shows how the relative weights on these components change with X
for the cases of full decentralization and partial decentralization (the case of di).
Figure 2
As can be seen on the graph, for a given value of X, full decentralization leads to a lower
weight on the compatibility component of di's action than partial decentralization. Under
full decentralization, di has an incentive to underweight compatibility since the costs of
incompatible technologies are shared between the two divisions. It will then overweight
the investment that fits her local knowledge. Similarly, the value of Xfor which equal
weight is assigned to both compatibility and local knowledge is lower under partial
decentralization (it is equal to 1/2) than under full decentralization (2/3). As a result, a
change in _ when 0 < X < - changes the relative weight between compatibility and local
3
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fit faster under partial decentralization than under full decentralization (and vice versa for
2
-< <).
3
The results in this section are driven by the fact that both divisions bear the cost of
incompatibility when both have decision rights. If only di bears the costs of
compatibility, then case 4 collapses to case 2. In this simple setting, there are therefore
two main cases: whether di has decision rights or not. The case when dj also has decision
rights influences di's actions (and payoffs) only because of the associated reward
structure in which marginal costs are split between the two parties.
7.4 Optimal Choice of Decision Rights Allocation
The former analysis shows the optimal actions on the side of the two divisions under the
four different regimes: full centralization, partial centralization when di gets to decide,
partial decentralization when dj gets to decide, and full decentralization. Using the
values of the optimal actions in equilibrium, we can determine the circumstances under
which headquarters will decentralize or centralize decision rights. In order to do this, I
compare the social output under the different regimes.
7.4.1 Full Centralization
Under full centralization, headquarters decide for each one of the divisions and
determines the optimal action. The analysis above showed that each division will be
asked to choose ai = aj = Oi. In this case, output is:
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F (ai,a, Oi) =E [X( - (ai -aj)2)+(1 - X)(1 - (ai - )2)]
E(1- X)(1- (i- _) )]
= (1- X)(1- 2)
7.4.2 Partial Decentralization: the Case of dj
We have seen that this case is equivalent to full centralization since each division's
optimal action in equilibrium is identically equal tooi in this case as well. Output is
then: FDj (ai,aj, Oi) = (1- X)(1-_ 2) as well.
7.4.3 Partial Decentralization: the Case of di
Recall that in this case, aj = i and ai = xOi + (I - X9i. Given these actions in
equilibrium, output is given by:
FDI(ai,aj,i) = (1 - (Xdi + (1- X)i - i)2) + ( - )(i - (x0i + (1 - X)Oi - )2)j
= X(1-(1- X)22) + (1- -X)(1- X22)
= 1 - Z(1 - ) 20 2 + I _ X _ X202 + 302
= -1 X(1- X) 2
7.4.4 Full Decentralization
The equilibrium in full decentralization was shown above to involve actions aj = Oi and
x~i + 2i(1 -- X)
ai = . The output in this case is:2
-x
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-X0i22-20i 
;)2 2+--X
.a2+ (-X 
F =X
=41-(2(X - 1) 2-
2(1- X)
+ Qi
2 -X
)22
9 )2
1 _X(I _ ' (_2(X - ) + X)
(2 _ X)2
=I- 5(1 - )(4 - 3) or2
(2--2)2
The following table summarizes the optimal actions for each division in equilibrium
under each regime, and the resulting output.
ai aj Fr (ai, aj, Oi)
Centralization Oi i - -
Partial Oi fi -X- )
Decentralization (j)
Partial X0i + (1 - xpi si 1 - X(1 - X)T 2
Decentralization (i)
Decentralization xOi + 20i(1- ) i -_ (X)(4 X)
2-X (2- X) 2
Table 9
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I-X-2+
\2 
+ (l-X 
7.5 Propositions
We can now state a number of propositions that derive from the results shown above.
Proposition 1: Delegating decision rights to a division that is only partially dependent on
another division leads to more diverse technological investments at the division than
when decision rights are centralized
Proof: follows by inspection of ai above
Proposition 2: The effect in proposition (1) is larger if both divisions were given decision
rights than if the partially-dependent division was the only division to which decision
rights were delegated
Proof: follows by inspection of ai above
Proposition 3: For a given level of uncertainty in the local environment, there exists a
unique degree of dependence between the divisions above which centralization is optimal
and under which partial decentralization (where rights are assigned to i) is optimal.
Furthermore, there is a non-zero interval for the dependence measure X such that if X
belongs to this interval, centralization is always better, for any level of uncertainty in the
local environment.
Proof: the cutoff value for xis determined by (1 - x)(1 - o 2) = 1 - X(1 - )cr 2 which
leads to the condition that )2 . This function is strictly increasing in X which
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proves part 1 of the proposition. The second part is proved by showing that
I X) 2
In the next section I describe a dataset that I used in order to conduct simple empirical
tests of the first proposition. The empirical findings confirm the result that
decentralization leads to more diverse technological investments.
7.6 Empirical Test
In order to model the choices of computer investments as a function of decision rights, I
assembled micro data on establishments of a large subset of Fortune 1000 companies
between the years 1995 (and a few years earlier for some sites) and 2001. Here I briefly
describe the behavior found in these establishments.
The sample consists of data on personal computer investments at sites of Fortune 1000
companies and the location of the purchasing decision (parent or local). To be in the
dataset, a site had to meet a number of requirements: first it had to report whether
purchasing decisions were centralized (parent) or decentralized. Second, it had to be
using at least one personal computer. The total number of sites meeting these conditions
over the years 1995 to 2001 is 145,540. The resulting sample is therefore very large.
About 59% of the sites reported that purchasing decision rights were centralized (parent),
the rest of the sites being local.
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Table 10 compares the locus of decision making over time. The results point to a trend
towards centralization.
Year Frequency of sites reporting local PC purchasing
decision rights
1996 57 %
1997 51
1998 48
1999 45
2000 43
2001 40
Table 10: PC purchasing rights from 1996 to 2001
The table shows that between 1996 and 2001 there has been a 30% increase in the
centralization of PC purchasing decision rights. In the framework above, this could be
because firms have become more integrated, or because division dj's knowledge of
division di's local conditions has become more uncertain.
In order to test the first hypothesis above, I calculated three measures of standardization:
the first metric is simply the total number of different PC types at the site, tottype. A
high tottype indicates that the establishment is using a lot of different PC types. The
second metric, called cratio 1, is a concentration ratio of the largest PC type at the site. In
other words, if type A is the PC type most used at the site, cratio 1 represents the share of
PCs of type A among all PCs at the site. The third metric, herf, is a Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index that uses the square of the shares of the different PC types at the site. A
high herf index indicates that PC purchases at the site are concentrated in a few brands.
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Table 11 presents statistics for these three metrics both for sites to which PC purchasing
decision rights have been delegated and sites for which decision rights remain at the
parent level. The table shows clearly, across all three metrics, that delegating decision
rights is associated with more diversity in computer purchases. The mean number of PC
types is 3.2 for "decentralized" sites and 2.2 for "centralized" sites. The Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index is almost 50% higher at "centralized" sites than at "decentralized" sites.
Decision Variable N Mean StdDev Min Max
D Tottype 53203 3.208 1.9 1 22
C Tottype 54611 2.205 1.38 1 17
D Cratio 1 53189 0.41 0.25 0.03 1
C Cratiol 54588 0.56 0.29 0.04 1
D Herf 53189 0.37 0.24 0.03 1
C Herf 54588 0.53 0.3 0.03 1
Table 11: Statistics for Standardization Metrics. D: Decentralized, C: Centralized
In order to control for PC usage at the site (sites with many PCs may exhibit higher
values for tottype and large sites may also be delegated decision rights more often), I
regressed the log of tottype on the decision rights dummy (local or parent) and the log of
the number of PCs at the site as well as the log of PC per employee at the site. The
results of this regression appear in Table 12. They show that controlling for the number
of PC's at the site and the number of PCs per employee at the site, delegating decision
rights is associated with a 30% increase in the total number of PC types used at the site.
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Variable Estimate Standard Error t Value Pr > Itl
Intercept 2.186 0.00735 297.54 <.0001
Decisionright 0.29 0.01006 97.33 <.0001
Log(PC) 0.045 0.00412 152.23 <.0001
Log(PC_pemp) 0.01494 0.00388 3.85 0.001
Table 12: Regression of Log(tottype) on different variables
The results so far confirmed the hypothesis (1) that computer investments are sensitive to
the location of purchasing decision rights at the firm. Consistent with the model
developed in the previous section, managers responsible for technology purchasing
decisions appear to diversify their IT investments.
7.7 Discussion
The empirical analysis above suggests that delegating decision rights to branch managers
is associated with more diversity in IT investments at the site. A priori, this finding is not
surprising: if managers are given purchasing decision rights, one could expect that they
would purchase more diverse computer systems. Although the intuition is borne out in
the data, delegating decision rights could theoretically lead to the opposite behavior:
depending on the reward structure, if delegating decision rights is accompanied with
more accountability (one of the features of the model above, in which the division that
has the rights also bears some of the costs of incompatibility) then managers that are risk-
averse may be more conservative in their investments than what a centralized authority
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would have judged optimal. This is similar to models of herd behavior in finance where
fund managers were found to be less likely to take risks when their performance was
evaluated relative to their peers (see Ellison et al., 2001).
In addition, if headquarters expect that branch managers to which decision rights have
been delegated are more likely to invest in less-standardized IT investments, and that this
behavior hurts the firm then they should not delegate decision rights. The fact that
despite this behavioral pattern delegation still takes place shows that a more complicated
explanation is needed . The model above presents a potential avenue to explain this
behavior.
There are a number of possible extensions, including a more detailed analysis of the
empirical dataset and a formal testing of the hypotheses derived from the model
developed above. Future work will consider testing the two other propositions
empirically and deriving additional insights from the theoretical model presented above.
7.8 Summary
The main purpose of this chapter was to develop a theoretical model of the tradeoff that
firms face in deciding whether to delegate decision rights to the division managers or
whether to keep them centralized. The model showed how the optimal allocation of
decision rights at the firm depends both on the degree of interaction between units and
the uncertainty in the local environment of the divisions. This gave rise to predictions
about when different allocation regimes will arise. Preliminary testing of the model was
also presented.
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8 Conclusion
This thesis has examined the business transformations that accompany IT investments
with a particular emphasis on the regional allocation of labor resources and the
distribution of decision rights across geographically-distant business units. This research
has provided important insights into two critical and interrelated management issues of
information technology: the first is the importance of location and the potential for IT to
substitute for location-based benefits and the second the allocation of decision rights
across geographically-distant business units. Specifically I found that:
1. Lower-cost locations are more attractive to IT-intensive firms leading to cost savings
of about 1% of total unit costs for every 10% increase in IT.
2. CSR employment is sensitive to the use of IT. An increase of 10% in IT usage
reduces employment by 1.3% on average.
3. Idiosyncratic factors that enter firms' location decisions are non-negligible. Still
regional characteristics help explain some of these preferences: location externalities
(the benefits of proximity to customers, other firms or other activities at the same
firm) explain part of the regional preferences. This provides support to
agglomeration models in economic theory.
4. I also found that sensitivity to location characteristics is lower the more decentralized
the firm is. Presumably, firms whose decision loci are decentralized may be able to
take advantage of regional cost differentials by delegating authority to the division
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managers. This led me to consider the reasons why managers may decide to delegate
decision rights to some divisions and not to others.
5. I set up a model that describes the tradeoff that managers face when investing in
information technologies: centralize decision making and achieve full compatibility
or decentralize decision rights so that technology can be adapted to the local
preferences and circumstances at the division level, sometimes at the expense of
compatibility.
6. I derived some hypotheses from the model and showed some empirical support for
these hypotheses.
The research findings in this thesis provide a useful avenue for understanding the reasons
for success or failure of location policies by urging firms to recognize and account for the
importance of location benefits when structuring their activities worldwide. The second
is the tradeoff that firms face between achieving compatible information systems across
the enterprise and still being able to access and tap local expertise. I described a model
with clear implications about when and why managers should decentralize purchasing
decision rights to the local divisions and when they should keep them centralized at the
headquarters. The importance of these two related questions will only grow as more
firms decentralize activities geographically in the "global" economy.
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Appendix A
Companies in the Sample and Their Standard Industry Classification
OSY..IOK:''.;EYIIgD':R.E.'lX'>'',r' i CCOM AN Y. : .. g i !
20 C C oca Cola Company
20 PepsiCo Inc
20 Sara Lee Corporation
20 ]1 Anheuser Busch Companies Inc
20 Campbell Soup Company
20 [Archer Daniels Midland Company
20 It W M Wrigley Jr Company
20 It Tyson Foods Inc
20 t Coca Cola Enterprises Inc
20 It Suiza Foods Corporation
28 IE I du Pont de Nemours & Company
28 II Procter & Gamble Company
28 II Dow Chemical Company
28 ]] Valspar Corporation
28 ] Colgate Palmolive Company
I28 J Johnson & Johnson
28 JiAmerican Home Products Corporation
28 31 P P G Industries Inc
28 Bristol Myers Squibb Company
28 Pfizer Inc
28 .} [ Avon Products Inc
28 Merck & Company Inc
28  Abbott Laboratories
28 Pharmacia Corporation
28 ][ Schering Plough Corporation
28 Ecolab Inc
28 Intrntl Flavors & Fragrances Inc
O l28 ] PolyOne Corporation
28 ] H B Fuller Company
28 I Great Lakes Chemical Corporation
28 It Revlon Inc
28 1 Praxair Inc
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II1
ISICKtYiI OCOMPAN
28 31 RPMInc
28 Estee Lauder Companies Inc
28 31 Eastman Chemical Company 
35 International Business Machines
35 Caterpillar Inc
35 3 Deere & Company
35 N C R Corporation
35 31 Ingersoll Rand Company 
35 IL Hewlett Packard Company
35 31 Cummins Engine Compan Inc
35 Timken Company
35 Black & Decker Corporation
35 3 Tecumseh Products Company 
35 31 Pitney Bowes Inc
35 3 Parker Hannifin Corporation
35 31 Milacron Inc
35 3Dover Corporation
35 Silicon Graphics Inc
35 Intel Corporation
35 ]1 Storage Technology Corporation
35 3S P X Corporation
35 The Toro Company
1 35 Kennametal Inc
35 Pentair Inc
35 3 Pall Corporation
35 3 Sun Microsystems Inc
35 Compaq Computer Corporation
35 F Seagate Technology Inc
35 ] Baker Hughes Inc
35 Terex Corporation
35 ]1 Maxtor Corporation
35 A G C O Corporation
35 ][ E M C Corporation
35 3 Com Corporation
35 ] Cabletron Systems Inc
35 IL Cooper Cameron Corporation
35 I Symbol Technologies Inc
35 I American Power Conversion Corp
I36 Rockwell Automation
36 _ Raytheon Company
36 ] Eaton Corporation
36 Texas Instruments Inc
[ 36 ] Vishay Intertechnology Inc
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36 3 Motorola Inc
36 Emerson Electric Company
36 Harris Corration
36 A O Smith Corporation
36 Cooper Industries Inc
36 National Service Industries Inc
36 National Semiconductor Corporation
36 Maytag Corporation
36 Thomas & Betts Corporation
36 Amphenol Corporation
36 Molex Inc
36 ]/ Micron Technology Inc
36 Exide Corporation
36 Tellabs Inc
36 Lucent Technologies Inc
36 3j Fairchild Semiconductor Intrntl
36 3l Altera Corporation
38 Eastman Kodak Company
38 31 Xerox Corporation
38 3 Beckman Coulter Inc
38 31 Baxter International Inc
38 31 Becton Dickinson & Compan
38 3Medtronic Inc
38 31 Thermo Electron Corporation
138 3 Teleflex Inc
38 Boston Scientific Corporation
38 Guidant Corporation
38 11 Stryker Corporation
38 K L A Tencor Corporation
38 J[ Dade Behring Inc
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Appendix B
Glossary
Variable Associated Reference
Parameters (if any)
- Arrival Rate
Sf - Sales (billions)
Df - Characteristics of the Firm(all variables that
are firm-specific)
Rf - Revenue from Customer Service
Pi Unit Costs of CSR in Region i
X[f - Number of CSRs hired by Firm f in Region i
a Order of the Polynomial that Approximates
Compounded Service Time
W - Time-average Waiting Time
Z - Service Time
Vi - Regional Characteristics (all variables that are
region-specific)
/if - Marginal Value of CSR in Region i to Firm f
m(D) - Vertical Differentiation Coefficient (a
Polynomial)
IT fl, ml IT Variable
G f3, m3 Number of Industry Segments
D m2 Decentralization Variable
UC Unit Costs (P in the model)
TI 32 Telecom Infrastructure
LS [ 3 Proximity Variable
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LF 1 Availability of the Labor Pool in the Region
Si Y State Dummy Variable
CSR f2 Average Number of CSRs in the Industry
ND f4 Dummy Variable for Non-Durable Industries
Table 5 Glossary of the variables in the model. For the variables that enter the econometric
specification, the associated parameters are included as well.
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